City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

2-2020

From One Period to the Next... : Menstruation and the
Psychoanalytic Process of Working through to the Feminine
Loryn L. Hatch
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3614
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

FROM ONE PERIOD TO THE NEXT…
MENSTRUATION AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCESS OF WORKING
THROUGH TO THE FEMININE

by

LORYN HATCH

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2020

© 2020
LORYN HATCH
All Rights Reserved
ii

From One Period to the Next…
Menstruation and the Psychoanalytic Process of Working through to the Feminine

by
Loryn Hatch
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in
satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

________________________
Date

_____________________________
Elliot Jurist
Chair of Examining Committee

________________________
Date

_____________________________
Richard Bodner
Executive Officer
Supervisory Committee:
David Lichtenstein
Steve Tuber
Jamieson Webster
Lissa Weinstein

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iii

ABSTRACT
From One Period to the Next…
Menstruation and the Psychoanalytic Process of Working through to the Feminine
by
Loryn Hatch
Advisor: Elliot Jurist
This dissertation delves into the theoretical treatment and place of menstruation in
psychoanalysis. Beginning in Chapter I with a broad and varied overview of
menstruation with a primary focus on Western culture, some of the persistent ideas and
themes, as well as their effects, are illustrated to help pose core questions about
menstruation, including how to think about its simultaneous presence and absence within
the social discourse and its relationship to psychoanalysis. Chapter II explores the
appearances of menstruation in Freud’s body of work, including its relationship to the
burgeoning field of psychoanalysis and the fixed place it holds in a constellation of
signifiers throughout the development of the Freudian myth of female sexuality. Chapter
III examines the place of menstruation in the psychoanalytic debates of the 1920s and 30s
on female sexuality, exploring various contributions by Freud’s contemporaries and the
sexual difference stalemate that years of prolific writing could not transcend. Chapter IV
outlines some of the key ideas and interventions of Lacan’s thinking to work through the
psychoanalytic treatment of menstruation, female sexuality, and the feminine, while
offering a clinical vignette that draws on the theory. Chapter V explores the work and
transformations of psychoanalytic theory by a selection of writers and artists who define
and reform Lacan’s notion of the feminine, while considering specifically the place and
effects of menstruation in this discourse as it relates to the subject and acts of creation.
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Introduction
Despite all that is known about menstruation, the biological phenomenon persists
as a question repeatedly posed and answered anew. Throughout the history of Western
thought and medical practice, the discourse and treatment of menstruation reflects not
only the knowledge trends of the day but also the vestiges of knowledge and fantasies of
previous eras. For the individual who menstruates, the experience of and relationship to
having a period changes in both dramatic and subtle ways with each cycle and each life
phase, as it does within each family and culture, where different perceptions of
menstruation are emphasized or denied. The variability inherent to this cyclical event
further amplifies when questions like “what is a woman” or “what makes a woman a
woman” are asked. The declaration “You’re now a woman,” often made at menarche,
receives mixed reception for those who aren’t quite sure what that actually means. While
menstruation stands as a sure marker of womanhood for many, this historical anecdote
from Anne Fausto-Sterling’s Sexing the Body (2000) reveals how singling out any one
trait to determine sex or gender can prove problematic as biological processes elide and
elude attempts at categorization:
In 1843 Levi Sudyam, a twenty-three year old resident of Salisbury,
Connecticut, asked the town’s board of selectmen to allow him to vote
as a Whig in a hotly contested local election. The request raised a flurry
of objections from the opposition party, for a reason that must be rare in
the annals of American democracy: it was said that Suydam was ‘‘more
female than male,” and thus (since only men had the right to vote)
should not be allowed to cast a ballot. The selectmen brought in a
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physician, one Dr. William Barry, to examine Suydam and settle the
matter. Presumably, upon encountering a phallus and testicles, the good
doctor declared the prospective voter male. With Suydam safely in their
column, the Whigs won the election by a majority of one. A few days
later, however, Barry discovered that Suydam menstruated regularly and
had a vaginal opening. (p.30)
Suydam’s intersex body confounds a system seeking absolute anatomical
difference between the two sexes. The simultaneous presence of distinctive male and
female sexual characteristics—a penis, testicles, regular menstruation, and a vaginal
opening—and the absence of others demonstrates there is no certain formula for
determining gender via anatomy. A woman who has a mastectomy does not lose her
womanhood without breasts. A person who menstruates may determine himself male.
That the menstrual cycle is at times declared the defining feature of womanhood, but is
just as often rendered insignificant, raises questions about its place and effects in the
reciprocal relations between the body, the subject, and the social order—relationships
that psychoanalysis addresses and transforms in theory and practice.
This dissertation will delve into the theoretical treatment and place of
menstruation in psychoanalysis.

Beginning in Chapter I with a broad and varied

overview of menstruation with a primary focus on Western culture, some of the persistent
ideas and themes, as well as their effects, will be illustrated to help pose core questions
about menstruation, including how to think about its simultaneous presence and absence
within the social discourse and its relationship to psychoanalysis. Chapter II will explore
the appearances of menstruation in Freud’s body of work, including its relationship to the
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burgeoning field of psychoanalysis and the fixed place it holds in a constellation of
signifiers throughout the development of the Freudian myth of female sexuality. Chapter
III will examine the place of menstruation in the psychoanalytic debates of the 1920s and
30s on female sexuality, exploring various contributions by Freud’s contemporaries and
the sexual difference stalemate that years of prolific writing could not transcend. Chapter
IV will outline some of the key ideas and interventions of Lacan’s thinking to work
through the psychoanalytic treatment of menstruation, female sexuality, and the feminine,
while offering a clinical vignette that draws on the theory. Chapter V will explore the
work and transformations of psychoanalytic theory by a selection of writers and artists
who define and reform Lacan’s notion of the feminine, while considering specifically the
place and effects of menstruation in this discourse as it relates to the subject and acts of
creation.
Beginning with Freud’s struggles to cure hysteria and the condition of
womanhood, on through the work of his contemporaries trying to codify one psychic path
for womanhood, and into Lacan’s theorizing of woman and the feminine standing as the
markers of the limits of our symbolic systems, the historical and structural obstacles for
women in finding an Other who would hear and permit their messages are apparent.
When these messages pertain to menstruation, a unique phenomenon of the female
anatomy that draws us to the limits of what the symbolic can account for in our
experience, discourse has historically stayed fixed in physical and gender essentialist
arguments. There is no certain formula for determining what it means to be a man or
woman via anatomy and thus we cannot pinpoint the biological trait of menstruation as a
marker of anything beyond female reproductive anatomy. Nevertheless, menstruation

3

has the power to evoke the ambiguities of life and death for both men and women, and as
a result, repressive forces both internal and external, that attempt to deny and mask these
junctures—especially death—where the symbolic fails and the lack is confronted. It is at
the very confrontation with this site of lack that sexual identity is formed and the
theoretical feminine is approached. This is also the site where clinical work flourishes,
and so in the process of exploring these ideas, the bearing that theory has on the clinic
and the position of the analyst will be considered, offering a window into the thought and
practices that shape my work as a clinician confronting the existential questions of sexual
difference and of life and death.
Psychoanalysis draws on the truth of fiction, of myth, and of representations that
capture what our pedantic and erudite language cannot fully grasp. With a background in
literature, my relationship to psychoanalytic theory and my own work as an analysand
has centered on an engagement with psychoanalysis’s literary foundations and its
development of the creative powers of language. Through my studies in the Clinical
Psychology program at City College University, with its deep roots in the New York City
psychoanalytic community, I began the work of learning how to translate these theories
into clinical practice. This dissertation has served as an opportunity to not only explore a
topic of personal interest, but also to consolidate my sometimes fragmented
understanding of challenging and elusive theoretical concepts and their applications.
Much of what I take on overlaps and is born from disciplines like philosophy and
linguistics, and includes movements and -isms like feminism, anthropology, queer theory,
deconstructionism, and so forth that I have not studied formally. My handling of certain
concepts will no doubt read as cursory to more versed readers. Nonetheless I chose this
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project because the not-knowing is attractive and motivating. An inevitable effect of this
approach (and really of any writing) is that something of one’s own subjectivity emerges
through the language and ideas put into play. It is because of the great teaching and
receptivity I have encountered through my work as an analysand, with professors, and
with clinical supervisors that I have felt supported to read and write according to my own
desire and to reveal something of myself along the way.

5

Chapter I
Throughout Western history, the topic of menstruation has been marked by a kind
of presence in absence in our everyday language and customs. A physical reality of
female reproduction that plays a part in every human’s experience, the idea of
menstruation has long been cast in the place of the abject—that which must be avoided,
scorned, and denied. Persistent refrains and overlapping themes of contamination and
pathology across scientific and humanistic disciplines in Western literature mark
menstruation as fundamentally taboo, the effect of which has been a general silence on
the topic. A brief, and by no means comprehensive review of menstruation’s more
historical notable mentions are well summarized in Janie Hampton’s 2017 article, The
Taboo of Menstruation. Hampton begins with Pliny the Elder’s oft-cited passage from
Natural History, written in the 1st century AD:
If a woman strips herself naked while she is menstruating, and walks
round a field of wheat, the caterpillars, worms, beetles, and other vermin,
will fall from off the ears of corn … bees will forsake their hives if
touched by a menstruous woman … linen boiling in the cauldron will turn
black, the edge of a razor will become blunted (para. 6).
Hampton goes on to note that in medieval times, “it was believed that if a man’s penis
touched menstrual blood, it would burn up, and any child conceived during menstruation
would be possessed by the devil, deformed, or red-haired” (2017, para. 7). Dark powers,
witchery, and menstruation are a focus for much of Mary Chadwick’s 1932 work The
Psychological Effects of Menstruation (further discussed in Chapter III) in which she
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posits that women persecuted for witchcraft were in fact women overcome by intense
menstrual cycles, endowed by their communities with powers to corrupt and corrode
human existence. Ideas of the taboo nature of women pervade major religions like Islam
and Judaism, and communities continue to structure themselves around the untouchable
otherness of the menstruating woman, cast as either sacred or sullied. In the book Nine
Pints (2018), journalist Rose George describes women in Pakistan whose segregation
during menstruation is viewed as a tribute to her fertility. In contrast, the Nepali custom
of chaupadi, sequestering menstruating women into huts, stems from a fear of
contamination the menstruating woman is believed to bring to her home. NPR reports
that a 2017 vote in Nepal to ban the practice has proven difficult to enforce in rural
villages where both men and women believe any change to the practice to be too risky to
their health and livelihoods (Priess, 2017). At the heart of the taboo of menstruation is
what George describes as the “two-faced nature of blood” (2018, p.4) a substance that
signals both life and death, and in turn conjures the many unknowns of our existence.
Menstrual blood bears the associations of life and death of all blood, but
maintains specificity in for its role in reproduction—a contentious bio-political site across
cultures and eras. A pull to segregate and control the menstruating body, to exalt its
sacred power as well as deem it vile and toxic, proves inescapable at present and in the
past. For instance, the struggle for women’s rights at the turn of the 20th century in the
U.S. produced a slew of gender essentialist arguments that use menstruation as the
biological marker of women’s fundamental vulnerability and inferiority. American
doctor Edward H. Clarke’s treatise from 1873, titled Sex in Education/or, A Fair Chance
for Girls illustrates the perspective and tone of the time, as he argues against women
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joining men in academia, detailing the perils of a menstrual cycle gone awry after
onerous intellectual strains. Clarke explains that the girl’s over-expenditure of brain and
physical power may disrupt the menstrual flow. He describes the poisonous, disastrous,
and evil effects he has observed in women who at puberty were healthy and vital, but fail
to thrive in their attempts to perform at the level of men. Clarke warns that these kinds of
academic pursuits compromise not only the woman’s own reproductive functions, but
most importantly, the future of the human race. Clarke’s perspective is echoed by
psychologist G. Stanley Hall in 1904’s Adolescent Girls and Their Education, who
develops a prescription for maintaining healthy reproductive function while allowing
girls the opportunity to learn. Hall advises that for two years after puberty, girls should do
little to no work and when they do resume their studies, they should plan on lying “fallow”
for a quarter of the year—the amount of time they will spend preparing for, recovering
from and actually menstruating (1904, para.17). Teachers should not wait for girls to
excuse themselves from schoolwork but should command that they do so when it is their
time of the month. Hall stresses that a girl’s
health for her whole life depends upon normalizing the lunar month…there
is something unhygienic, unnatural, not to say a little monstrous, in school
associations with boys when she must suppress and conceal her feelings and
instinctive promptings at those times which suggest withdrawing, to let
nature do its beautiful work of inflorescence (1904, para. 84).
Hall positions his authority as a psychologist on the side of nature and thus of what is
healthy and normal. In his recommendation to sequester menstruating girls, Hall evokes
the haunted words of Pliny and others as he characterizes the girl’s desire for something
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outside of what he deems natural to be “monstrous” and “unhygienic,” a threat to the
“beautiful work” of her reproductive destiny.
A vacillation between what is stable, healthy and normal and what is monstrous,
unclean and out of control, can be seen in many examples from 20th century Western
culture, especially with the rise of the advertising industry. Society’s ambivalent
relationship to menstruation can be deciphered in the confused messages about
menstruation advertisers employed to reach their target consumers. A somewhat
surprising example can be seen in the 1946 Walt Disney educational film, The Story of
Menstruation, which gives a tidy and generous introduction to young girls about their
menstrual cycle, advocating a life full of social activity and vigorous exercise even during
that time of the month. Sponsored by the feminine hygiene brand Kotex, the film imparts
the message that “There's nothing strange nor mysterious about menstruation. All life is
built on cycles and the menstrual cycle is one normal and natural part of nature's eternal
plan for passing on the gift of life” (Gregory, 2014). In contrast, a 1986 Tampax
commercial evokes the shame of menstruation, as the then teenage actress Naomi Watts
laments the many “hassles” a teenage girl has to endure, including little brothers, break
outs, gaining weight, and finally that hassle “every month—that one you don’t talk about”
(Gee, 2019). But luckily the “hygienic” tampon applicator makes everything “easier and
cleaner,” allowing Watts to wrap herself in pristine white towels without fear of stains.
The idea of menstruation being “that one you don’t talk about” is made explicit in this
commercial, but noting omissions of the topic can be more difficult. A legacy of silence
was documented by historian Laura Klosterman Kidd who in her analysis of the diaries,
letters and inventory supply lists of North American pioneer women of the 19th century,
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found no direct mention or reference to menstruation (Hampton, 2017). Menstruation for
these pioneer women was absent from the most intimate discourse, something women did
not even acknowledge to themselves.
The notion of menstruation as unspeakable takes root in ideas of it as contaminant,
as invisible and malignant force, and as a source of pathology. The enduring effects of
these taboos give power to myths and falsehoods that leave people susceptible to the
influence of those making a profit and those with a political agenda. Psychologist Joan
Chrisler describes an effect of these taboos witnessed in her years teaching at Connecticut
College:
After more than 30 years of teaching the psychology of women, one might
think that nothing students say or do would surprise me. Yet I continue to
be amazed about how little students know, or understand, about women’s
reproductive health. It is clear that they have had little access to reliable
information, and much of what they “know” comes from popular culture
and is based on stereotypes. For example, most of my students are
unfamiliar with the terms menarche and dysmenorrhea, do not realize that
premenstrual changes are not synonymous with premenstrual syndrome
(PMS), do not know the difference between PMS and menstrual cramps,
say ‘during my menstrual cycle’ rather than “during menstruation”
because they do not understand that the cycle is continuous, claim never to
have heard of follicle stimulating hormone or luteinizing hormone, have
no idea that 20% of pregnancies result in miscarriage, assume that women
need medical supervision during the menopausal transition, are ignorant
10

about the process of giving birth, and utilize terminology popularized by
the

Right-to-Life

Movement

rather

than

scientific

terms

(e.g., unborn or pre-born baby rather than fetus) because they do not even
realize the difference. A male student once astounded me (and the rest of
the class) by insisting that the peak of women’s fertility is during
menstruation, which is why people so rarely engage in sexual intercourse
at that time. Why do my otherwise intelligent and sophisticated students,
who know so much more than I did at their age about careers and about
the world, display so much ignorance about women’s bodies? Perhaps the
clearest explanation is that menstruation and other reproductive processes
are stigmatized (2013, p. 128).
Chrisler’s commentary puts forth the significant medical and scientific knowledge that
was gained during the 20th century about the female reproductive cycle, while also
highlighting the continued ignorance about it. Chrisler evokes many of the findings,
diagnostic developments, and social movements that resulted from turn of the century
discoveries about sex hormones, which dramatically changed our understanding and
approach to managing the menstrual cycle. In the 1930s pharmaceutical companies began
working with medical researchers to create medicinal cure-alls for female ailments and,
concurrently, Dr. Robert Frank identified a set of patients who experienced more severe
symptoms than the usual “premenstrual tensions ” (Stolberg, 2000). Though premenstrual
symptoms like mood swings, cramps, and generally frustrated relations to the outside
world have long been documented throughout the centuries, it was the medicalization of
these symptoms in the mid-20th century with the advent of premenstrual syndrome (PMS)
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that gave menstruation a new place in 20th century society at large, replacing notions of a
hysterical, wandering womb with isolated hormonal imbalances that targeted something
other than the woman’s very being as problematic, but nonetheless maintained the
discourse of the menstrual cycle as pathological.
The establishment of a premenstrual syndrome and its heir, Premenstrual
Dysphoric Disorder, have generated controversy across disciplines and professional
sectors as doctors, pharmaceutical companies, and women have pushed to take control of
the discourse and in turn, treatments for these conditions. Today for many women
seeking medical help in managing their menstrual cycle common interventions include
encouraging women to regulate hormones through diet and exercise and with birth
control. With birth control menstruation can be completely suppressed, occur biannually
or at variable intervals, or appear monthly for those who wish to maintain an idea of
normalcy. For psychological symptoms of sadness, edginess, tension, and irritability,
treatment with SSRIs is common (Casper, 2019). While some women have welcomed the
space diagnoses like PMS provide for talking about this experience and for getting some
relief, others have criticized the medical emphasis that pushes out the cultural and social
factors impacting the female cycle. Voices of dissent against the diagnoses argue that
research has failed to show an identifiable pattern or endocrinological abnormality that
would distinguish women with PMS from those without the diagnosis (Richardson, 1995),
and worldwide studies of women have shown great variations across cultural groups of
understanding and experience of premenstrual symptoms with many cultures having no
concept of a premenstrual syndrome whatsoever (Snowden & Christian, 1982). Use of
the word “syndrome” implies a group of symptoms that are abnormal to the general
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population. In the case of PMS and PMDD it has proven difficult to isolate this group,
especially as the narrative of these conditions have set the terms of what the experience
of menstruation is for many modern women. Richardson writes that “The actual
experience of menstruation seems to have little effect on girls’ attitudes towards
menstruation,” (1995, p. 763) as any symptom experienced is interpreted through the
language of these syndromes. The study of menstruation in fields like anthropology and
gender studies, as well as the influence of Eastern and alternative medicine on wellness
movements in the US, bring a different set of questions forward, emphasizing aspects like
“increased capacities of emotional responsiveness and sensitivity, creativity, and physical
sensuality” (Martin, 1988) that often go unacknowledged and uncultivated in general
education.
For centuries the forces highlighted in this brief overview reveal why for many
modern women menstruation is a phenomenon devoid of place, ritual, and significance
outside of pathology and consumerism, which turns the monthly event into a condition in
need of disposable products and medications to eradicate the hassle of it. But in the past
decade a notable shift has begun to take place. Today, for instance, psychologists are
demonstrating more nuanced readings of menstruation across cultures that
anthropologists of the late 20th century documented in their studies of the varied
menstrual practices and meanings found across the world. A recent survey of
psychological research shows a shift toward qualitative studies attempting to integrate
how factors like media representations, socio-economic status, education, and ethnicity
shape a woman’s experience of menstruation throughout her lifecycle. Articles with titles
like “We Keep It Secret So No One Should Know’ - A Qualitative Study to Explore
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Young Schoolgirls Attitudes and Experiences with Menstruation in Rural Western Kenya”
(Mason et al, 2013), “Ambivalent Sexism, Attitudes Towards Menstruation and
Menstrual Cycle‐Related Symptoms” (Maravan & Vazquez, 2013), “Knowledge,
Practices, and Restrictions Related to Menstruation among Young Women from Low
Socioeconomic Community in Mumbai, India” (Thakur et al, 2014), and “The Function
of Ethnicity, Income Level, and Menstrual Taboos in Postmenarcheal Adolescents’
Understanding of Menarche and Menstruation” (White, 2013) demonstrate attention to
the specificity of the experience at individual and cultural levels, as well as interest in
what individuals actually have to say about their periods.
At a broader level, menstruation has been part of shifting social conversations and
confrontations with gender, and is at times a pointed place of pride and activism. NPR
dubbed 2015 “the year of the period” as artists, activists, politicians and consumer
industries redefined ways of representing and addressing the monthly flow (Gharib,
2015). Since 2015 the United Nations has named menstruation a global public health and
human rights issue, addressing it through management of “menstrual hygiene” and
education to combat the ostracizing of girls from education and work (UN News, 2019).
A “tampon tax” debate with the tag line, “periods aren’t luxuries,” earned a critique of
the policy from President Obama when YouTube personality Ingrid Nielson brought the
tax to his attention in 2016 (Al Jazeera, 2016). Advocacy efforts for access to pads and
tampons in schools, workplaces, and prisons have also made recent headlines and
headway with policy changes (Michaels, 2019). Marketing campaigns for innovations
like Thinx reusable “period panties,” Diva cups, organic pads and tampons free of
synthetic chemicals, and so on, have been hard to miss on subways, billboards, and
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commercials. These new, more direct advertising campaigns often feature models of
varying size, race, and gender directly speaking about their cycles, putting the variability
of menstruation on the minds of millions. And menstruation as object of art and protest
is no longer relegated to galleries and museums. A striking example made headlines in
2015 when artist Kiran Gandhi ran the London marathon without a tampon. The headline
“Woman Runs London Marathon without a Tampon, Bleeds Freely” with images of Ms.
Gandhi’s soiled leggings circulated the Internet. Gandhi was quoted saying, “When I was
running, I knew it was a choice of privilege: I knew that there was something radical in
doing that. But I also wanted to acknowledge the billions of women and girls in the world
who don’t have the same choices that I had in that moment” (O’Donnell, 2015).
In a time when longstanding taboos are partially stripped of their power, choices
abound, and women have brought attention to many unacknowledged facets of their
quotidian reality, the ongoing effects of the history of menstrual taboos still surface and
show these taboos maintaining a powerful hold. 25 year-old director Rayka Zehtabchi,
whose film, Period. End of Sentence, won an Oscar in 2019 for best documentary short,
stated in an interview that, “After seeing the film I hope people understand this period
stigma doesn’t just affect those in India, we experience it in the United States and in other
cultures as well” (Lawler, 2019). Zehtabchi’s film shows the strangling effects these
taboos have not only on society as a whole, but also on how both sexes relate to the
realities of the female body. In various scenes we see individuals of all ages struggle to
even speak the words “period” and “menstruation,” their cheeks growing flush with
embarrassment, and the words stalling and stuttering at their lips. While menstrual
taboos in India may seem remote and less relevant to Western society, the not-so distant
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memory of when then presidential candidate Trump attempted to undermine reporter
Megayn Kelley’s ability to moderate the 2015 Republican debate with his description of
“blood coming out of her eyes, coming out of her wherever,” shows how the idea of
menstruation can still be called upon as something shameful and horrific (Yan, 2015).
Even at a personal level, the shifts I was noticing in the public sphere felt far from certain
relationships and domains. During a visit to Texas, my 94 year-old grandfather asked me
about my dissertation topic. I hesitated before replying, “It’s about menstruation.” He
shook his head with dismay and moaned “Oh, baby, no!” I replied that his response was
the very reason it was a good topic to take on.

Given that questions like “What is menstruation? What purpose does it serve? Is
it necessary?” can be answered in infinite ways and because the topic of menstruation has
long provoked the kind of loaded and ambivalent responses so far described, I, as a
person who menstruates, analysand, reader of psychoanalysis, student of psychology, and
clinician, have looked to examine menstruation through the psychoanalytic theories that
in my formation as a clinician have offered openings in places, experiences, and
dynamics that often seem impossibly closed and stuck. Despite the obvious cultural and
societal discourses that shape our understanding and reaction to menstruation both
consciously and unconsciously, it is notable how much it remains treated as simply a
biological phenomenon without psychical presence.
Mysterious, haunting, painful, destabilizing, hidden, present, irrepressible, fluid,
blocked, heavy, light, forgotten, anticipated, and simultaneously signaling both an ending
and a beginning: this stream of words describes something of the characteristics, contours,
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and movement of menstruation as well as the psychoanalytic process of working through
life’s many ambiguities and paradoxes, of enduring seemingly ceaseless repetitions, and
of having the opportunity to turn them into something new before they assimilate into the
familiar. The menstrual cycle is subject to a whole world of external and internal
influences, but also follows its own rhythm. The word “menses” derives from the Latin
word “mensis,” meaning month, and is thus tied to our collective and individual sense of
time. Unconscious processes and the subject’s psychical time play a significant role in
shaping how the physicality of menstruation is expressed, experienced, and interpreted.
The ever-shifting repetition of the menstrual cycle offers an interesting point from which
to explore the intersection of the symbolic body of psychoanalytic knowledge of female
sexuality and its relationship to the real of the body. The treatment of menstruation in
analytic theory allows us to simultaneously explore the development of certain analytic
concepts, as well as how the theory itself is subject to the same unconscious mechanisms
that Freud first delineated. But as Kate Donmall notes in her 2013 article, What It Means
to Bleed, menstruation as a phenomenon is not so readily found in psychoanalytic theory,
citing how in Wright’s 1992’s Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary there
is not even one indexed reference to menstruation. The absence of menstruation in
psychoanalytic theory is made even more curious by the persistent refrain that the topic is
never addressed in any serious way by the field. The long history of taboo previously
outlined can be inferred to play a part in this absence, but the question of how
menstruation does appear in the theory remains.
In tracking the appearances of menstruation in Freud’s work, the enduring
questions of the unconscious and its relationship to the female body emerge in
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anticipation of theoretical developments that would come decades later. Freud’s
statement “anatomy is destiny” is the oft-quoted launching pad for discussions on how
the body and psyche shape each other. The problematic aspects of this decree become
most apparent in the 1920s and 1930s debates on female sexuality, where the many
components of female sexuality across the lifespan are obscured by phallocentric
fantasies of sameness between the sexes. Colette Soler expresses something of the
stupefaction this psychoanalytic legacy provokes in What Lacan Said About Women:
“What is scandalous is the inability to think what is specific to femininity, and still more,
the Freudian ‘forcing,’ which measured women by the standard applied to men” (2006, p.
12). Freud’s ideas of the unconscious, repression, drives, and castration, as developed by
Lacan through their relationships to formulations on desire, lack, and the Other (a term
with many facets and elaborations but that essentially refers to the symbolic order of
language and laws through which the subject comes into being) not only transcend the
impasses of later Freudian theory, but most importantly reintroduce a space of possibility
and creation in the Freudian myths of sexual difference.
In my early readings of psychoanalytic theory, the confusion of ideas on female
sexuality left me with the sense that I could barely grasp the elusive thing that would
answer my or anyone else’s questions about what psychically makes a woman a woman.
The experience of encountering bizarre fantasies (particularly in the case of the female
orgasm) and reading of the negative effects generated by theory (Marie Bonaparte’s
repeated clitoral surgeries stand as a disturbing historical example) suggested something
strange was being enacted as theorists of that period became tangled between the real of
body and the meaning we make of it. In certain schools of analytic thought the concrete
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adherence to Freud’s ideas of sexual difference, as well as the careful evasion of the
problematic aspects of his ideas (despite their centrality to the theory), has distorted and
compromised the sexuality that is most vital to psychoanalytic theory and practice.
The initial inscrutability of Lacan’s work (made all the more difficult in that I do
not speak French, nor is Lacan prominent in American psychoanalytic teaching), has
rendered my encounter with statements like “the woman does not exist,” and therefore
“the sexual relation does not exist” perplexing, especially as word on the street suggested
that these statements offer a passage through what was most confounding to me about
psychoanalytic theory’s treatment of female sexuality. The ongoing process of working
through my theoretical questions in personal and professional settings has moved me
away from the essentializing traps our everyday lives and systems perpetuate and into a
realm where the impossibility of totalizing gender and identity becomes a liberating
theoretical perspective and in turn, the lens through which I view something of the
psychoanalytic contribution to clinical practice. In psychoanalytic terms, this ever
shifting, “not-whole” is what Lacan tied to his theory of the feminine. When freed from
illusions of totality, the feminine marks the limit of what can be known and not, as well
as the space for creation. It is also a force that many attempt to deny, limit and stall,
especially as the imaginary idea of complete thought and theory are threatened. While the
theoretical feminine does not depend on the biologically female, in what ways does a
relationship exist between them? Furthermore, a question for this dissertation is how to
place menstruation, a phenomenon of the female anatomy, into this theoretical schema of
the feminine.
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The encounter with the theoretical and experiential limits and openings of the
feminine has led to my engagement with theorists, writers, and artists who have pushed
and changed how the female body is represented and realized within the social link.
Lacan’s years of work have and continue to stimulate a wealth of provocative writing
about the feminine by those seeking to clarify, counter, deepen, extend, and create new
registers of experience across disciplines. This work presents a new economy and new
registers of perception for interpreting menstruation and for recognizing its influence in
unexpected places. Encountering the writers and artists that formalized something of the
elusive feminine and brought awareness to the art and culture where fantasies of the
female body play out, has further developed how I listen and engage as a clinician. The
work of punctuating the words and repetitions that flow in free associations with
analysands has brought forth a constellation between menstruation, memory, and writing,
and along with it, the existential questions about the psychoanalytic process that each
analysand asks and answers for herself.
Menstruation has been the experience of female sexuality thus far most complex
for me, in part because of how the dark, brooding history briefly outlined here has shaped
my personal experience of it. Working through my relationship to menstruation through
psychoanalysis has revealed what I find most compelling about analytic work and theory.
Every single spot, every bit of blood, and every absence of it, can mean something
entirely different each time for each woman. This recognition of difference in repetition
is central to the work of the analyst and the analysand. Both within and outside of
analysis there is something to be gained from speaking and being heard in our own
particularity. While the analytic act does not promise to solve the questions of life’s great
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mysteries and impossibilities, it does give us a code for being with and for marking the
significance of processes like menstruation that provoke the ambiguities of life, what is
known and not known, and the potential that can be born at that limit.
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Chapter II
Even after over a century of developments in psychoanalytic theory,
psychoanalysis does well to return to Freud’s prolific body of writing, where his
experimental yet careful thought process and theoretical contributions offer generative
encounters with the unconscious as it is theorized and as it reveals itself inadvertently.
Following menstruation’s appearances throughout this body of work brings forth
important ties between menstruation and the concepts that shape the very heart of the
theory. Beginning with Freud’s discoveries and frustrations with hysteria, and into the
psychical mechanisms of dream work and defenses like repression, his use of myth and
literature, and the psychosexual stages and the development of the drives, menstruation
surfaces in pivotal texts, sometimes in rather curious ways that cannot be definitively
interpreted, but rather, lead us down the path of inquiry that is both familiar and ripe with
potential to be enlivened with something new.
In 1888’s Hysteria, Freud describes the onset of hysterical neurosis as most
commonly beginning at the age of fifteen for women, where it follows either an
unremitting course or comes in sporadic episodes:
As is well known, an early age, from fifteen onwards, is the period at
which the hysterical neurosis most usually shows itself actively in females.
This can happen either by an unbroken succession of comparatively slight
disturbances

(chronic hysteria)

or

by

several

severe

outbreaks

(acute hysteria) separated by free intervals lasting for years. The first years
of a happy marriage interrupt the illness as a rule; when marital relations
become

cooler

and

repeated

births
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have

brought

exhaustion,

the neurosis re-appears. After the age of forty in women the illness does
not usually produce fresh phenomena; but the old symptoms may persist
and strong provocations may intensify the illness even at an advanced age
(p. 52).
Nearly 40 years later in 1926’s The Question of Lay Analysis, Freud’s prognosis for
women suffering through their reproductive life cycle takes on a wryly pessimistic tone,
but otherwise remains unchanged: “Indeed, there is not much that can be done; nature
must help, or time. With women there is first menstruation, then marriage, and later on
the menopause. Finally death is a real help” (p. 232). After decades treating patients,
Freud concedes that psychoanalysis offers little relief for being a woman; the realities of
the female’s biological and social conditions can only be assuaged by death.
This pessimistic prognosis for finding “something that can be done” to help the
condition of womanhood begs the question of what the pathology of womanhood is.
Menstruation is one part of the whole reproductive life that Freud describes, as much a
symptom and source of suffering as the societal expectations and events of womanhood.
The psychoanalytic confrontation with the questions of womanhood continues a long
Western history of confounding the physical and social conditions that shape the female
sex. Menstruation, virginity, marriage, pregnancy, motherhood, menopause, and, as this
chapter will explore, even death, indicate potential designations of woman, but also can
be the very sites of woman’s undoing. As previously noted, inherent to the word
“menstruation” is a relationship to time, with the Latin menstruus meaning “month” or
“monthly.” The word “period” became synonymous with “menstruation” in the 19th
century, further merging this sense of time with ideas of departure and return as “period”
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is born from the Greek word periodos with peri meaning “around” and hodos with
“going, way, journey.” Freud’s description of womanhood reflects a journey in time with
departures from and returns to illness, the markers of womanhood as much chronological
points as they are symptoms and cures for something that never quite goes away. Perhaps
the very thing that cannot be escaped is the idea of death, which stands as the ultimate
cure against suffering, its specter haunting the passage of time and the entire reproductive
cycle with its many beginnings, endings, creations, losses, and the fears of the unknown
they all engender.
The female body in its variable states provokes anxiety with the impossible
paradoxes its powers of creation can provoke. It blurs distinctions between interior and
exterior, and as the locus of early analytic exploration, obscured the distinction between
the biological origin and the hysterical creation. Freud’s discovery of the unconscious
similarly upsets ideas on a notion of objective, scientific truth with the elusive truth of the
individual subject, who uniquely interprets and often subverts that which seems fixed and
absolute, and who emerges as something entirely other than her anatomy and what
society expects of it. In a footnote to 1893’s Case Histories from Studies on Hysteria,
Freud demonstrates something of how his early analytic work pulled at the tangle
between the biological events of the body, synchronous social events, and the place of
analysis in making meaning of it all after the fact, in his description of his work with an
unnamed 38 year-old woman with whom he worked in “non-somnambulistic” states
while still employing techniques of touch and suggestion. He is determined to find the
nucleus of the woman’s disease and arrives at her first hysterical episode when she was
17 years old, at which point he continues to press her for details:
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The attack was now to some extent explained. But I still required to know of
some precipitating factor which had provoked the memory at that particular
time. I formed what happened to be a lucky conjecture. “Do you remember
the exact street you were walking along just then?”— “Certainly. It was the
principal street, with its old houses. I can see them now.”—“And where was
it that your friend lived?’—“In a house in the same street. I had just passed it,
and I had the attack a couple of houses further on.”—“So when you went by
the house it reminded you of your dead friend, and you were once more
overcome by the contrast which you did not want to think of.” I was still not
satisfied. There might, I thought, be something else at work as well that had
aroused or reinforced the hysterical disposition of a girl who had till then
been normal. My suspicions turned to her monthly periods as an appropriate
factor, and I asked: “Do you know at what time in the month
your period came on?” The question was not a welcome one. “Do you expect
me to know that, too? I can only tell you that I had them very seldom then
and very irregularly. When I was seventeen I only had one once.”—“Very
well, then, we will find out when this once was by counting over.” I did the
counting over, and she decided definitely on one particular month and
hesitated between two days immediately preceding the date of a fixed
holiday. “Does that fit in somehow with the date of the ball?” She answered
sheepishly: “The ball was on the holiday. And now I remember, too, what an
impression it made on me that my only period that year should have had to
come on just before the ball. It was my first ball.” (Freud, 1893, p. 112)
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As a clinician in this period attempting to understand the relation between the psychic
and the physical, Freud identifies the body and the reproductive cycle as the site where
the symbolic is written, but also as the trigger for what is symbolized, and helps the
patient stumble onto the factors contributing to an over-determined hysterical event. The
personal relationship between these core ideas of womanhood is forged (and forced to
some degree) for Freud’s patient as if by chance, with the timing of a debutante debut
(and all that implies) and the reminder of unexpected and inevitable death converging to
make a psychic fault line at the very point that the physical body marked the potential for
new life with her first period.
Freud’s reconstruction of the events precipitating the woman’s case of hysteria
create a myth of origin to explain what had previously been disconnected and unknown.
The snags of conscious life that can lead to a suffering subject center on the mysteries,
paradoxes, ambiguities, and pieces of experience language has not been able to explain or
mask sufficiently, the places where we become aware that our systems of meaning fall
short and thus cannot support us. Much of psychic work—and the overall trajectory of
Freud’s psychoanalytic theoretical development—is an attempt to bridge these points of
disconnect. 1900’s The Interpretation of Dreams shows the psychic mechanisms that
construct artifices of meaning around life’s mysteries. In a section in which Freud
examines the ways that dreams condense contradictory and seemingly irreconcilable
content, pushing us to rely on interpretation and the mechanics of language to make sense
of the paradoxical, his case example centers on the female body caught in the categorical
trappings of womanhood:
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Thus the blossoming branch in the dream without any doubt alluded to
sexual innocence. However, the branch was covered with red flowers, each
of which was like a camellia. By the end of her walk—so the dream went
on—the blossoms were already a good deal faded. There then followed
some unmistakable allusions to menstruation. Accordingly, the same branch
which was carried like a lily and as though by an innocent girl was at the
same time an allusion to the Dame aux camélias who, as we know, usually
wore a white camellia, except during her periods, when she wore a red one.
The same blossoming branch represented both sexual innocence and its
contrary. And the same dream which expressed her joy at having succeeded
in passing through life immaculately gave one glimpses at certain points (e.g.
in the fading of the blossoms) of the contrary train of ideas—of her having
been guilty of various sins against sexual purity (in her childhood, that is).
In analyzing the dream it was possible clearly to distinguish the two trains of
thought, of which the consoling one seemed the more superficial and the
self-reproachful one the deeper-lying—trains of thought which were
diametrically opposed to each other but whose similar though contrary
elements were represented (Freud, 1900, p. 319)
Much later, Freud describes the mind’s capacity to hold “similar though contrary
elements” in 1921’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, when he writes,
In groups the most contradictory ideas can exist side by side and tolerate
each other, without any conflict arising from the logical contradiction
between them. But this is also the case in the unconscious mental life of
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individuals, of children and of neurotics, as psycho-analysis has long
pointed out (p. 79).
As the flower-laden passage demonstrates, menstruation and by extension, female
sexuality, arouse conflict for the subject attempting to reconcile contradictory but central
ideas of womanhood, including “innocence and its contrary.” While Freud explains these
contradictory ideas are tolerated in the unconscious of children and neurotics, it can be
presumed that they do cause conflict in conscious life. Poised at the precipice where it
marks a simultaneous ending of one cycle and a beginning of another, menstruation is a
lived reminder of the life cycle that existed before and will continue after us, and for
which we all search for explanations that bring coherence to existence.
It is through language and systems of meaning, in the form of myths, religion,
philosophy and so forth that we are able to construct a passage between opposites.
Freud’s work, and the many iterations of psychoanalysis born from it, center on his
choice of the myth of Oedipus to reflect something of the familial dynamics that structure
our identifications and relationships. For a myth that captures something more distinct
and unique of womanhood, the Greek myth of Persephone and Demeter offers a redolent
story of the changing of the seasons for mother earth and her daughters. As the myth is
often told, the young virgin Persephone, daughter of Demeter, goddess of the harvest,
finds herself caught between life and death, between fertility and barrenness, and between
girlhood and womanhood, when she is ripped from the earth and taken down into the
underworld by Hades to be his bride. In one rendition of the story, Persephone eats
nothing while held captive except for six pomegranate seeds. After months of searching
for her daughter, bereft Demeter lets life wither on earth. When the ordinary mortals
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begin to starve, Zeus and the other gods intervene to return Persephone to Demeter, but
the pomegranate seeds she ate keep her beholden to the underworld for six months of the
year, marking the change in seasons on earth. In the figure of Persephone, the cyclical
patterns of womanhood are captured and resolved with a somewhat reassuring story of
separation and reunion between the living and the dead. In the fertile kernels of the blood
red seed of pomegranate, the life and death powers of women’s gendered blood are
evoked and become the determining element for the bridge between opposing worlds.
Persephone’s status as virgin is a crucial element to the structure of the myth and
to many other myths and stories that feature young women in this pivotal position. In her
study of the virgin in Ancient Greece, classics scholar Helen King describes the transition
from parthenos, virgin, to gyne, woman, as involving “a series of bleedings, each of
which must take place at the proper time” (2002, p.88). King notes that the word gyne is
the word for both wife and woman, and that it was only in becoming a wife that a woman
was recognized as such and most fully integrated into the social structure. With menarche,
the newly menstruating girl becomes the virgin, whose mature but unbound sexuality
becomes a potential threat. The virgin should be carefully protected by her family and
should only shed the blood of defloration on her wedding night and the blood of
childbirth as a wife. The time in between, when the girl is a fertile but unwed, is most
problematic and reflectively, menstrual blood is recognized both as an essential sign of
fertility and also a source of pathology if not “remedied” with marriage quickly. Looking
at the connection between the virgin of Ancient Greece and the virgin of 16th and 17th
century England, King (2002) notes that English doctors of the Early Modern era
translated the early Greek term peri-parthenion to “the disease of virgins,” (which she
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notes is best translated as “the disease of the unmarried”) and further maintained ideas
and practices in treating hysterical symptoms from Ancient times. King cites a striking
example in a 17th century English text on female reproductive health that references a
description from Hippocrates that states menstrual blood should move regularly and
heavily, “like that of a sacrificial victim” (2004, p. 9). The chorus in Euripides’ Iphigenia
in Aulis, sings of such sacrifices and blood flow as they laud the virgin Iphigenia:
O look at the girl who walks/to the goddess’ altar…Her hair in garlands
of honor/ and flung upon her body the lustral waters/ she will go to the
goddess’ altar/which she will stain/ and her lovely body’s neck/ with
streams of flowing blood (2013, p. 133, 1510-1515)
Iphigenia’s virgin blood is the catalyst for the Trojan War, which begins following her
sacrifice. Ultimately this blood does not belong to her, but instead to her father, her
country, and even to a diagnosis.
That the virgin’s body is imbued with powers that transcend the physical is
evident in her mythical status and the level of importance placed on transitioning her to
either wedded womanhood or to sacrificial death. But as Freud notes in his wry
description of the trajectory of woman’s suffering, not even the solution of marriage
could cure the problems of womanhood, including hysteria and its many iterations, which
throughout history can be seen to be the symptom of the symbolic debts, demands, and
taboos placed on women’s reproductive powers. Freud addresses the topic of taboo in
1913’s Totem and Taboo beginning with the word taboo itself which “means, on the one
hand, ‘sacred’, ‘consecrated’, and on the other ‘uncanny’, ‘dangerous’, ‘forbidden’,
‘unclean’” (p. 18). He observes that taboo status is given to “physical states of
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menstruation, puberty or birth, and to all uncanny things, such as sickness and death and
what is associated with them through their power of infection or contagion” (Freud, 1913,
p. 22). Freud searches for an explanation as to why taboos have such great reach,
affecting individuals, states, and objects:
How is this to be brought into line with the fact that taboo attaches not
only to a person who has done what is forbidden but also to persons in
particular states, to the states themselves, as well as to impersonal objects?
What can the dangerous attribute be which remains the same under all
these different conditions? There is only one thing it can be: the quality of
exciting men's ambivalence and tempting them to transgress the
prohibition. (1913, p.32)
Here taboo is identified as an important limit, a structuring blockade against man’s
animal impulses and most reprehensible desires. In this reading we could say that the
emphasis on the virgin’s purity and innocence is a blockade against her tempting
sexuality and potential violations of the social order. However, the notion that a taboo is
instituted to restrict a desire shifts to the idea that a taboo protects man against what he
most fears in Freud’s 1918 paper The Taboo of Virginity. At first, Freud focuses on the
fear and horror of blood being at the root of the taboo of virginity, writing, “When a
virgin is deflowered, her blood is as a rule shed; the first attempt at explanation, then, is
based on the horror of blood among primitive races who consider blood as the seat of life”
(1918, p.196). Shed blood links to life taken and death prevailing, thus, “the taboo of
virginity is connected with the taboo of menstruation which is almost universally
maintained. Primitive people cannot dissociate the puzzling phenomenon of this monthly
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flow of blood from sadistic ideas” (1918, p. 197). Freud goes on a few moments later to
conjecture that
one might almost say that women are altogether taboo. A woman is not
only taboo in particular situations arising from her sexual life such as
menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth and lying-in; apart from these
situations, intercourse with women is subject to such solemn and
numerous restrictions that we have every reason to doubt the reputed
sexual freedom of savages (1918, p.198).
A noticeable shift from virgin to woman takes place in Freud’s writing, for all women,
not just virgins, bleed. The “sadistic ideas” blood arouses mark women as taboo no
matter where they are situated in their cycle, as the threat of their blood knows no bounds.
As Freud describes, a kind of primal fear of this blood and of sexual difference itself puts
a halt to the desire to cross forbidden boundaries:
perhaps this dread is based on the fact that woman is different from man,
forever incomprehensible and mysterious, strange and therefore apparently
hostile. The man is afraid of being weakened by the woman, infected with
her femininity and of then showing himself incapable (1918, p. 198-199).
In this line of thought, woman in her difference and with her bleeding becomes a kind of
deadly threat now stripped of the allure and temptation of other taboos (though we can
see that fear does not cancel desire, but is often part of it). An initial desire denied, the
source of man’s repudiation and fear of women is that in his attraction to her, he will be
overcome, weakened, and shown incapable, his limits and vulnerabilities exposed. Here
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the path from woman’s blood to man’s demise is laid out with woman in her difference
unconsciously tied to death.
Freud ends his exploration of The Taboo of Virginity with a quick turn to the
quotidian symptom of frigidity in women, which he deems a reaction formation against
the desire and envy for the penis the woman is lacking, and presumably also the rage. The
hostility, envy, and castrating effects of the woman are further theorized for years to
come, forming a storyline on female psychosexual development in which the threat of
death evoked by women’s gendered blood, and the hostile and weakening powers it holds,
is absent, while the emphasis on women’s inferiority, lack, and envy are emphasized.
Freud’s theory on female sexuality, a tributary of the Oedipal complex, had lasting
effects on psychoanalysis, some of which will be explored in the next chapter. However,
returning to Freud’s earliest discoveries of the unconscious through the talking cure and
his own self-analysis creates another path through the many theoretical stalemates his
later work on the female Oedipal complex generate, his early work shows the subject’s
pleasure, suffering, and experience of all kind to be connected and transformed through
language as lived in speech. Through analytic work the analysand approaches the
illusory boundaries between body and mind, past and present, external and internal, and
masculine and feminine, and reconstitutes his/her relationship to these ideas and
experiences of them. The organic events of the female body and the meaning put on
them by philosophy, medicine, biology, mythology, literature, anthropology and so on,
fuel the discourse on sexual difference that the each analysand has to work through. The
power of free association and the articulation of thoughts through speech reaches beyond
the fixed and rigid ideas that limit the subject, the body, and her social position, creating
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potential for the analysand to no longer be held captive to notions of what men and
women are and are not.
The female reproductive cycle in its many repetitions, beginnings, and endings,
presents endless possibilities for marking the at times traumatic interplay between the
anatomy and biological processes that constitute the female sex and the social
constructions that mark a woman in society. Freud’s own beginnings as a biologist often
lead him to place the biology of the body first in his research, despite his recognition that
the work of analysis exists in another place. Freud writes in the 1914 Preface to the Third
Edition of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality that his objective in his analytic
researches is “to discover how far psychological investigation can throw light upon the
biology of the sexual life of man” (1905, p. 131). He goes on to explain,
Throughout the entire work the various factors are placed in a particular
order of precedence: preference is given to the accidental factors, while
disposition is left in the background, and more weight is attached to
ontogenesis than to phylogenesis. For it is the accidental factors that play
the principal part in analysis: they are almost entirely subject to its
influence.

The dispositional ones only come to light after them, as

something stirred into activity by experience: adequate consideration of
them would lead far beyond the sphere of psychoanalysis. (1905, p. 131)
The dispositional factors, those inherent to the body and the species, can only be
understood after the accidental factors specific to the individual, i.e. her place in society,
culture, and family, are examined. Nachträglichkeit, après-coup, or afterwardness—the
process by which secondary traumas give form to primary trauma—is what Lacan later
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interpreted from Freud’s writing to be the essence of analytic work. The individual
subject of analysis makes meaning of changes in the body and changes in experience of
the body only with time, repetitions (in all their variability), and a process of reflection.
With repetition of events, a marking of difference, and a building of definition through
basic language and eventual discourse, the oft-mysterious shifts of the body are registered
as signs that can be interpreted and contextualized in larger discourse that is
simultaneously the subject’s own and part of the Other. But even with this work of
understanding, meaning does not remain fixed and what is thought to be known can fall
away, making the acquisition of specific knowledge of less significance than the ability to
engage the analytic process itself at these junctures where something is thrown into
question.
Beyond the clinic and into the history of psychoanalysis, chance and accident,
made vital by the specter of death, play important parts in the place of menstruation in its
theory and in making sense of how the reality of the female body was eclipsed in later
discussions of female sexuality. In the late 1800s Freud was very much engaged with his
colleague and confidant, Fliess and, as a result, with Fliess’s theory of “periodicity,” the
idea that both men and women are cyclically affected by male and female versions of
menstruation. Freud explored periodicity in his correspondence with Fliess with both
skepticism and enthusiasm, sending word of his own perceived cycle, his wife’s
menstrual cycle, and when his eldest daughter reached menarche. He also strived to
connect Fliess’s theory to his own theories of neurosis. In an 1896 letter to Fliess he
writes,
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I dare to understand my anxiety neurosis: the menstrual period as its
physiological model; the anxiety neurosis itself as an intoxication, for which
an organic process must furnish the physiological foundation. The unknown
organ (the thyroid or whatever it may be) probably will not, I hope, remain
unknown to you for long. I was greatly delighted with the male
menopause as well; in my “Anxiety Neurosis” I boldly anticipated it as the
last condition [giving rise to anxiety neurosis] in men (Freud, 1895, p. 174)
During this period Freud was working to demonstrate that bodily processes serve as the
basis for the neuroses, and much of his consideration of menstruation in Fliess’s theory is
from this vantage. It is notable that an assumption of sameness between the sexes begins
not with male physiology in the above example, but instead with the female menstrual
cycle as a model for neuroses. Freud entertained Fliess’s theory in thinking about his own
symptoms, considering a relationship between his own nosebleeds, headaches, and his
menstrual cycle, as well as the symptoms of his patients, which marks the shift his theory
takes in making the male sex primary all the more striking. The connection between the
nose, female genitals, and menstruation was central to Fliess’s theory, most clearly
developed in his 1897 paper, The Nose and the Female Organs, as well as to elements in
Freud’s telling of “The Dream of Irma’s Injection” in 1900’s The Interpretation of
Dreams. Freud collaborated with Fliess in treating his intractable patient Emma Eckstein,
aka Irma, to help cure her erratic menstrual cycle and the hysterical symptoms the men
believed were connected to it. Freud’s analytic work seemed to offer no relief and so he
sent her to Fliess, who, when operating on Eckstein’s nasal cavity, left a piece of gauze
inside, which led to a nearly deadly infection and tremendous suffering. Freud was
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present for the moment when the gauze was discovered weeks later in Eckstein’s nose
and pulled out, causing a tide of blood to gush forth—a traumatic moment that Freud
vividly recounts to Fliess in a letter, while reassuring Fliess that he is forgiven for this
grave error.
However, over the course of several years, the relationship between Freud and
Fliess deteriorated. In the 1993 book, Menstruation and Psychoanalysis, Mary Lupton
explores the prominent role menstruation played in Freud’s burgeoning ideas as a result
of his relationship with Fliess, and its connection to the split between the two. Lupton
argues that the idea of menstruation was repressed and the reality of it denied as Freud,
deserted the bleeding Emma, and therefore women’s bleeding, in his
attempt to protect Fliess (and also himself) from personal anxiety and
public disapproval. As he gradually retreated from Fliess and from the
concept of the nose and its effect on the genital organs, so he retreated
from menstruation, eliminating it as a possible major consideration in the
study of female psychosexual development—as the marker of sexual
difference (1993, p.33).
Lupton illuminates much about Freud’s early relationship to menstruation and then the
relative absence of menstruation in later theory. But Lupton is prone to totalizing
interpretations (including the pull to label menstruation “the marker of sexual difference”
in the above passage) and attempts to put menstruation at the heart of Freud’s later
treatment of female sexuality, with the trauma of the Freud/Fliess rupture creating a
personal for taboo for Freud on the topic. There is a seductiveness to Lupton’s
conjecturing that menstruation became the repressed representative of Freud’s break with
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Fliess, but this presumptuous and imposing interpretation style replicates phallocentric
thinking in a search for one source and one answer to questions about female sexuality in
psychoanalysis with many possible answers. (As well as one answer for the split between
the two—reading Freud’s letters to Fliess shows Fliess’s envy of Freud’s success to be
another of many factors in their split.) Freud’s guilt over what occurred in his treatment
with Eckstein can be inferred in his letters and is a key piece of Lupton’s theory about
why menstruation fell from Freud’s focus. But menstruation was Fliess’s topic, not
Freud’s, who in his analysis of “The Dream of Irma’s Injection” associates to questions
and concerns about the very nature of analytic work itself, including the moral and ethical
issues arising for the analyst treating an array of symptoms presented by hysterics of both
sexes:
This, as may well be believed, is a perpetual source of anxiety to a
specialist whose practice is almost limited to neurotic patients and who is
in the habit of attributing to hysteria a great number of symptoms, which
other physicians treat as organic. On the other hand, a faint doubt crept into
my mind—from where, I could not tell—that my alarm was not entirely
genuine. If Irma's pains had an organic basis, once again I could not be held
responsible for curing them; my treatment only set out to get rid
of hysterical pains.

It

occurred

to

me,

in

fact,

that

I

was

actually wishing that there had been a wrong diagnosis; for, if so, the blame
for my lack of success would also have been got rid of. I reproached Irma
for not having accepted my solution; I said: ‘If you still get pains, it's your
own fault,’ I might have said this to her in waking life, and I may actually
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have done so. It was my view at that time (though I have since recognized
it as a wrong one) that my task was fulfilled when I had informed a patient
of the hidden meaning of his symptom. (Freud, 1900, p. 109)
Pinning the limited discourse on menstruation to the trauma of the Eckstein surgery and a
ruptured relationship with homoerotic underpinnings leaves us with little else to say
about the psychoanalytic treatment of female sexuality, including the clinical issue Freud
is raising in this passage about how to work clinically with neuroses that seem to want
something other than an absolute interpretation. Nonetheless, Lupton is on the trail of the
unconscious throughout her work, as the attention and importance she pays to the
Freud/Fliess relationship is justified with the return of certain signifiers including the
nose, the genitals, smells, and stinking, that appear in connection to the few mentions of
menstruation that occur in papers that build Freud’s theory of the drives.
The Freudian trieb or drive can be described as the theoretical vehicle for moving
between ideas of the psyche, sexual body, and the laws of civilization. The word “drive”
was translated into English by Strachey as “instinct,” a choice many have criticized for
the emphasis on the biological dimension of the concept which obscures its psychical
nature. 1915’s Instincts and Their Vicissitudes explains something of the relationship
between the biological and psychical dimensions of the drive:
If now we apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological
point of view, an ‘instinct’ [drive] appears to us as a concept on the
frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical
representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and
reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for
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work in consequence of its connection with the body (p. 121-122).
Freud begins with the biological origin of the drive, which places events like
menstruation as the origin of the drive circuit. Yet it is clear that the practical and clinical
application of the drive comes only through a “psychical representative.” The
manifestations of the drive are thus constituted in a system of signification through which
the clinical work of analysis operates. The concept of the drive links, transforms, and
synthesizes polarities like biological and psychical, internal and external, and even nature
and nurture, making it from this vantage, a tool of language, much like myth, that helps
psychoanalysis traverse illusory gaps and divisions between the body and the mind.
Integral to the nature of the drives is the conflict and ambivalence that comes with
becoming “civilized,” i.e. developing new circuits and pathways for how the body is
expressed and is thus received by others, a process contingent on language that prohibits,
instructs, and constructs a new relationship to the experience of how the body functions.
In Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, Freud describes how the libidinal drives may reverse
into opposites (for example, pleasure into disgust and active into passive), turn from the
object back onto the self, be repressed, and be sublimated. This split between two, is, as
Freud notes in this paper and elsewhere, the core of neurosis as much as it is at the core
of the drives as they navigate the psychosexual stages.
For the Freudian subject the progression through the oral, anal, phallic, and
genital phases involves a reorganization of diffuse and dynamic drives that respond to a
host of changing internal and external experiences shaped by the demands of the outside
world. Focusing on the libidinal drives that develop and organize through the
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psychosexual phases, 1912’s On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of
Love (Contributions to the Psychology of Love) provides a description of how drives
affect and are affected by culture, and also by evolution. Freud writes that the libidinal
drive
is originally divided into a great number of components—or rather, it
develops out of them—some of which cannot be taken up into the instinct
in its later form, but have at an earlier stage to be suppressed or put to
other uses. These are above all the coprophilic instinctual components,
which have proved incompatible with our aesthetic standards of culture,
probably since, as a result of our adopting an erect gait, we raised our
organ of smell from the ground. The same is true of a large portion of the
sadistic urges which are a part of erotic life. But all such
developmental processes affect only
the complex structure.

The

the

upper

layers

fundamental processes which

of

produce

erotic excitation remain unaltered. The excremental is all too intimately
and inseparably bound up with the sexual; the position of the genitals—
inter urinas et faeces—remains the decisive and unchangeable factor
(1912, p. 189).
While the psychosexual phases mark specific organizations around bodily orifices and
interpersonal relations, we see here that there are many drives that comprise the sexual
drive. Beneath the “upper layers” of the psyche, ie the ego, the polymorphous pleasure
and excitation of an unboundaried body persist, including the once dominate sense of
smell that is replaced with eyesight once man begins walking. The emphasis on the
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olfactory, the upright gait, and the relationship to urine and feces is important for placing
menstruation within the Freudian schema.
In the 1908 paper The Sexual Theories of Children, Freud explores what could be
categorized as the “coprophilic instinctual components” that organize over time
according to cultural standards, in a series of observations on how children make sense of
the world of sexuality they cannot comprehend due to their sexually immature bodies and
experiences. This world of sexuality includes menstruation, intercourse, procreation, and
marriage. At the heart of the child’s search are questions of origin and questions of sexual
difference, and what they have to do with each other. Freud puts forth three key
hypotheses formed by children attempting to solve these mysteries: 1. All humans
possess a penis 2. A cloacal theory of birth, and 3. A sadistic theory about intercourse.
Here and in 1909’s case study on Little Hans, Freud proposes that it is the penis/phallus
that appears as the first answer to the riddle of the female body, a solution that denies
what is perceived and fills a seeming absence with fantasy. According to Freud there is
no awareness of the vagina for either sex and so the cloacal theory of how a baby moves
from inside a woman to outside is made through the child’s experience of his/her anus
(Freud makes a point to remind the reader that for children these ideas are far less
repugnant than they are for civilized adults). Menstruation is a complete unknown to the
child, and any evidence of it in the form of spots on the bed or found rags in the bathroom
is associated to parents fighting and expressions of aggression. What is known of sexual
intercourse, sometimes through a witnessing of the act, is also associated with these
sadistic ideas. The child wonders what any of this has to do with being married and
having a family. The adult mysteries of sexuality and relationships can only be filtered
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through the child’s experience of his/her own body, often rendering attempts at
connecting the physical events of the body into the greater symbolic system messy,
confused and awkward, as Freud illustrates in the story of a newly menstruating 14 yearold girl seeking to understand how the real blood of her period connected to the symbolic
blood relations of marriage. Freud writes that the young girl had “arrived from the books
she had read at the idea that being married consisted in a ‘mixing of blood’,” and put this
theory to the test when “the lustful girl made an assault on a female visitor who had
confessed that she was just then menstruating, so as to force her to take part in this
‘blood-mixing’ ” (1908, p. 222-223). The girl’s determined search demonstrates the
mysteries that are shrouded at every level of sexual experience, especially when the
culture of a family and society keep knowledge secret.
The prohibitions, avoidance, and deception children receive from adults in
response to their researches lead to a sense of the forbidden and even the “repugnant,”
pushing children to “consequently hide their further researches under a cloak of secrecy.”
The desire to know, however, stays strong, resulting in the psychical conflicts and
defenses surrounding sexuality observed in the neuroses of adults. Freud describes how
such a psychical conflict may soon turn into a ‘psychical dissociation.’
The set of views which are bound up with being ‘good’, but also with a
cessation of reflection, become the dominant and conscious views; while
the other set, for which the child’s work of research has meanwhile
obtained fresh evidence, but which are not supposed to count, become the
suppressed and ‘unconscious’ ones. The nuclear complex of a neurosis is
in this way brought into being (1908, p. 214).
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Awareness of the forbidden, violent, and unthinkable sexual phenomena of adults is
repressed (often not so successfully) and becomes part of the nuclear complex of
neurosis—these early theories sent into hiding and left unaddressed and stagnant. The
content of this 1908 paper and the anecdotes Freud chooses place menstruation at the
heart of psychical disassociations, where it is the target of the disgust and shame felt
toward drive expressions connected with anal, sadistic urges. The psyche’s response to
the liminal qualities of menstruation is similar in some ways to how Freud describes its
reaction to the body’s other excesses described in the psychosexual stages. However,
menstruation holds its own power in its primal connection to the ultimate split between
life and death.
The culmination of Freud’s thinking on the drives begins in 1920’s Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, where he challenges one of his fundamental theories, the absolute
reign of the pleasure principle, when observing the inexplicable compulsion to repeat
trauma. Freud puts forth the concept of the death drive, which imbues the former libidinal
drives with a conflictual but ever present pull to stasis, completion, and quiet, as much as
pleasure and satisfaction. Beyond the Pleasure Principle’s famous vignette of Freud
observing his young grandson organize himself in relation to his mother’s departure
through the repetition of the signifiers “fort” (gone) and “da” (back), shows the dual
nature of the drive at work in an act of linguistic creation that manages the frustrating loss
of the mother that must be endured. The drive works to quiet the addled system,
simultaneously navigating the opposing binary of presence and absence, while repressing
the destructive urges rising up in the repetition.
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1930’s Civilization and its Discontents develops the significance of the death
drive, letting the concept circulate out from the individual and into society at large.
Freud gives a grim prognosis for society as he describes how the presence of the death
drive will always keep us from some kind of utopia with its ever-present pull toward
destruction. It is striking that in this seminal text the fixed constellation of the olfactory
and menstruation returns almost unaltered in a somewhat digressive footnote that
references the work of Freud’s contemporary, CF Daly, whose papers on menstruation
will be discussed in the next chapter, as well as Fliess’s “periodicity” (albeit indirectly).
Freud writes,
The organic periodicity of the sexual process has persisted, it is true, but
its effect on psychical sexual excitation has rather been reversed. This
change seems most likely to be connected with the diminution of the
olfactory stimuli by means of which the menstrual process produced an
effect on the male psyche. Their role was taken over by visual excitations,
which, in contrast to the intermittent olfactory stimuli, were able to
maintain a permanent effect. The taboo on menstruation is derived from
this ‘organic repression’, as a defence against a phase of development that
has been surmounted. All other motives are probably of
a secondary nature. (Cf. C. D. Daly, 1927.) This process is repeated on
another level when the gods of a superseded period of civilization turn into
demons. The diminution of the olfactory stimuli seems itself to be a
consequence of man's raising himself from the ground, of his assumption
of an upright gait; this made his genitals, which were previously concealed,
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visible and in need of protection, and so provoked feelings of shame in
him. The fateful process of civilization would thus have set in with man's
adoption of an erect posture. From that point the chain of events would
have proceeded through the devaluation of olfactory stimuli and
the isolation of the menstrual period to the time when visual stimuli were
paramount and the genitals became visible, and thence to the continuity of
sexual excitation, the founding of the family and so to the threshold of
human civilization. This is only a theoretical speculation, but it is
important enough to deserve careful checking with reference to the
conditions of life which obtain among animals closely related to man
(1930, p.99).
The move to an upward gait causes a shift from reliance on the olfactory to the visual
senses, and from the uncivilized to the civilized, with the isolation of the menstrual
period one step in the process of the “founding of the family,” which is the point in the
main text that the footnote further elaborates. This family is the beginning of civilization,
and as the Oedipal complex posits, the founding of neuroses. Menstruation is in no other
way present in this text, but the themes it has related to throughout Freud’s writing and in
his personal experience return in the very place that Freud considers that which is
impossible to fully assimilate in our systems of language, culture, and subjective
existence: death and destruction. The surfacing of menstruation at this juncture nods to
its primacy in the pull between life and death, as much as it does its inability to be
accounted for in a meaningful way.
The libidinal and death drives are at the root of the compulsion to repeat, to re-
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find the lost object and master a trauma that has passed. The rhythms of the menstrual
cycle reflect something of the repetitions we are destined to live, the end of one period
marking the beginning of a surge of life and the opportunity for creation of the new. If
this union is not made, a new tension rises, with its denouement in the release of the
bloody uterine lining. This cycle reflects a larger cycle with a beginning and an end in the
reproductive lifespan of the female body. It is during this time period that both women
and men are confronted with what is most oppressive, miraculous, foreboding and
inescapable with regular frequency, the passage of time marked according to the rhythms
of the body. The taboo nature of blood and all that it evokes for us in these opposing
forces is what Freud deems at certain points to be the source of the taboo he placed on
women and thus on female sexuality, which ultimately stands as a reminder of the death
we cannot escape. The effect of this taboo was a continued denial of women’s
experience in psychoanalysis (which can be found in many other disciplines as well) that
will be explored in the next chapter in anticipation of Lacan’s formalization in theory of
this denial and its bearing on the clinic.
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Chapter III
When reading the proliferation of papers written during the 1920s and 1930s on the
psychosexual development of the little girl, it does not cease to impress that often times in the
psychoanalytic rendering of women, the clinic no longer informs the theory, but instead the
theory is imposed upon the clinic. While analysts present endless case examples that fit the fixed
theoretical narrative of how the little girl comes to be a woman, a lack of resolution pervades the
contributions of the time, and perhaps in part accounts for the volume of writing produced during
the period. This lack of resolution on the question and place of sexual difference in clinical
practice and theory persists today in many psychoanalytic schools where female sexuality is
obscured or vaguely addressed in relation to the Freudian narrative of development as it existed
then: caught between a literal interpretation of the castration complex rooted in the anatomy and
biology of the female body—in which case it is ironic that the actual female biological processes
are given so little consideration—or a symbolic interpretation that speaks to a phenomenon
beyond the imaginary female experience.
Freud had no formal theory regarding the psychological aspects of the female
reproductive cycle other than recognizing its presence in neurotic outbreaks. With certain
differences between the sexes ignored and others acknowledged, the female body in
psychoanalysis was constructed through a variation on the Oedipal myth that laid a template for
interpreting all biological processes through a narrative that explained the past, present and
future of how women related to their bodies compared to men. In his translator’s note to 1925’s
Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes, Strachey argues
that though the question of difference was one that Freud avoided while maintaining an
assumption of sameness between the sexes in his early work, there were moments where this

48

assumption did not hold, leaving Freud stymied about how to theorize these obvious differences.
Strachey observes that many of the details of Freud’s later theories of female sexuality presented
in Some Psychical Consequences and again in 1931’s Female Sexuality are a synthesis of the
years of the divergent observations and speculations that appeared as early as 1905’s Three
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. But it is the formal recognition of difference that eventually
produces a lasting theoretical change, which leads Freud to declare, “that we shall have to retract
the universality of the dictum that the Oedipus complex is the nucleus of the neuroses ” (1931, p.
282). This retraction can be seen as an extension of the Oedipus Complex to earlier ages in the
young girl’s life, the change a slight shift in the subplot in the original myth that provides an
opening for eventually formalizing the Complex as a function of something other than a linear,
developmental timeline for both sexes.
Freud’s well-known narrative of female psychosexual development can be summarized
as follows: There is one libido and it is masculine. The little girl and the little boy both take
their mother as their first love object. At the time of the phallic phase, the little girl recognizes
that her clitoris is not the same as the little boy’s penis and is insufficient for expressing her
masculine libidinal urges for her mother. With the revelation of this difference, the little girl
remains stuck in the pre-Oedipal period in which the maternal relationship is central. The girl has
no awareness of her vagina or understanding of her later reproductive capacities. She is
forbidden from clitoral masturbation. The girl realizes that even before the prohibition against
masturbation, she had already been castrated. As a result of her perceived deficiency she
becomes envious of males, and hateful towards her mother, whom she blames for failing to
bestow her with the proper equipment to express her virility. The ambivalence felt toward the
mother leads to a difficult passage from her mother to her father as love object. The little girl
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turns to her father for the long lost penis, which becomes equivalent with the baby she is
promised to create some day. Her rejection of her mother as love object is made all the more
challenging in that the girl must still identify with her mother to become a successful little
woman. Her ambivalent feelings stall her superego development, rendering her morally inferior
to the more resolute and less ambivalent man. At puberty, a necessary shift from the clitoris to
the vagina as primary erogenous zone takes place and the girl renounces the inferior pleasures of
her clitoris, and when the time is right, is able to orgasm vaginally with the help of her husband’s
penis. The path to womanhood is marked as more circuitous, protracted, dependent on the
outside world, and thus fundamentally different than the man’s.
Freud describes something of the impetus for putting forth a new theory of female
sexuality:
If I think I see something new, I am uncertain whether I can wait for it to be
confirmed. And further, everything that is to be seen upon the surface has already
been exhausted; what remains has to be slowly and laboriously dragged up from
the depths. Finally, I am no longer alone. An eager crowd of fellow-workers is
ready to make use of what is unfinished or doubtful, and I can leave to them that
part of the work which I should otherwise have done myself. On this occasion,
therefore, I feel justified in publishing something which stands in urgent need of
confirmation before its value or lack of value can be decided (1925, p. 249)
Despite the sense of urgency to stake out new theoretical terrain, the debates on female sexuality
of the 20s and 30s reflect the “slow and laborious” character Freud describes with critique,
discovery and clarity mired in a transferential stronghold as much as emboldened by the call for
confirmation. This “eager crowd of fellow-workers” indebted to Freud as founding father
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struggled to decipher precisely what part of the narrative was problematic and how they could
rectify it. Freud’s discovery that the sexual experiences of early life set the stage for all that
follows is an oft-cited beginning for his colleagues when tackling the topic of women, and at
times appears as a kind of injunction forcing many into a position where they had to build on an
origin story premise to be able to look at women’s life experiences, suggesting a vision of the
unconscious that is more archaeological than dynamic. A confusion of tongues and registers take
place as the Oedipal complex, the threat of castration, and the development and functioning of
female sexual anatomy are all assumed to operate and converge in way that is biological fact,
leading to countless distortions and a persistent repudiation of biological realities. Despite its
specificity to the female sex, its duration throughout the female reproductive years, and its direct
link to anatomy, menstruation is considered only through the Oedipal castration narrative, as it
was understood at the time. In reviewing some of the papers that reference or focus on
menstruation, an image of the castrated woman as she was encountered, conceptualized, and
directed in psychoanalytic treatments of the time emerges, as does the difficulty that would
paralyze many branches of psychoanalysis in future decades. The ambivalence toward women
as represented and treated here is striking as analysts reflect the phenomena they see and
earnestly attempt to contextualize, while simultaneously perpetuating a discourse that often
pathologizes, demeans, dismisses, and generally misses an encounter with the subject.
In the writing of Helene Deutsch, a psychoanalytic pioneer who spent her career
doggedly addressing each part of a women’s reproductive functioning from puberty to
motherhood to menopause, the organizing conceit is of the castrated woman, who suffers
traumatic blows to her narcissism with each life phase. Deutsch works on the premise that
experiences of anatomical inferiority, penis-envy, feminine masochism, and the shift from
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clitoral to vaginal maturity, are predetermined and at the core of female experience. Though her
ideas evolved over the years, she remained loyal to this castration framework, exemplified in her
1930 paper The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of Women. Here Deutsch aims to
connect the “function of feminine instinct to the function of reproduction” to better understand
the “feminine, passive-masochistic disposition” (1930, p.48). She describes this passage to
masochism as “part of the woman’s anatomical destiny, marked out for her by biological and
constitutional factors, and lays the first foundation of the ultimate development of femininity”
(1930, p.52) embodied in the shift from the phallic clitoris to the passive vagina waiting to
receive the penis. She describes the girl’s eventual acceptance of her lack of a penis transforming
into an active wish to be castrated by her father—a transformation of her active phallic urges into
masochism. This, according to Deutsch, is when the female child psychically becomes a woman.
Conflicts like frigidity sometimes arise for women who have assumed this feminine, masochistic
position, who then experience the phallic power of an orgasming vagina. Deutsch calls on
psychoanalysis to resolve these conflicts, tasking the discipline with the immediate objective of
helping patients experience more pleasure, and ultimately, the dubious aim of “preservation of
the race” (1930, p. 57). Deutsch’s ideas on masochism maintain this universal scope as she goes
on to interpret the masochistic desire to be castrated as the basis for women’s desire to be “raped”
and an explanation for the satisfaction found in the pain of childbirth. Deustch further pushes
female masochism as fundamental to the woman’s essence and experiences throughout history
when she writes,
Women would never have suffered themselves throughout the epochs of history
to have been withheld by social ordinances on the one hand from possibilities of
sublimation, and on the other from sexual gratification, were it not that in the
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function of reproduction they have found magnificent satisfaction for both urges
(1930, p. 60)
These core psychoanalytic themes, as represented by Deutsch, circle around the experience of
womanhood as it has been represented for centuries, and codify the implicit idea of the
inferiority of women by declaring that women are castrated and never fully realized men. This
harmful premise neglects to create other possibilities for how women experience biological
events like menstruation, confuses the issue of castration between the sexes, and, at its most
destructive level, perpetuates systems of violence and oppression. This perspective also has
problematic ethical consequences in that ascribing to the certainty of these ideas demands the
clinician push patients of both sexes to accept these truths premised on biological essentialism.
Today the Freudian female castration complex story can feel drained of its incendiary charge, its
claims easily dismissed and its implications a vestige of another time. But encountering the
violence this line of thinking has the potential to condone and even engender, as well as the
dubious ethical position the analyst can create for herself in assuming certain characteristics are
biological bedrock and not an effect of structures beyond anatomical givens, re-enlivens the
critical nature of the issues that were at stake in these early days of analysis and that remain
unresolved today.
While Deutsch presents a particularly conservative stance on these core ideas of
femininity as they relate to biological events, other theorists offer a more paradoxical depiction
of castration in relation to menstruation. Abraham writes in the 1922 paper Manifestations of the
Female Castration Complex that because it bleeds, “the female genital is looked upon as a
wound, and as such it represents an effect of castration” (p. 3). He goes on to state that “The
primary idea of the wound is re-animated by the impression created by the first and ever
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succeeding menstruation—and then once again by defloration—for both processes are connected
with loss of blood and thus resemble an injury” (1922, p.7). Abraham later considers another
perspective on the experience, describing a young girl whose older sister gets her first period,
which has a competitive effect on the young girl who believes her sister has gained something
with her period: the lost, castrated penis. Klein (1932) also writes of menarche as a moment of
gain as it marks the girl’s new capacity to reproduce, while also drawing out its possible
interpretations as a failure on the part of the woman to obtain the penis and thus the penis
substitute, a baby. Similarly, Horney (1931, 1933) describes menstruation as triggering feelings
of loss over an unrealized child. Both Klein and Horney suggest that for the woman whose
period is felt as a sign of failure, there is also an attending feeling of guilt as the forbidden
desires of childhood sexuality are aroused with each cycle. Masochism is the effect of this guilt,
which according to Horney (1935), can be enacted and observed through the menstrual cycle in
symptoms like dysmenorrhea and menorrhagia, as well disturbances related to pregnancy and
childbirth, marking the menstrual cycle as a vehicle for expression of unconscious conflict. The
relationship between menstruation and castration becomes a tension between having and not
having in which neither possibility guarantees an escape from the pain of castration and how the
psyche metabolizes this pain.
The issue of having or not having links to the play between activity and passivity that
characterizes each psychosexual stage. To be fed or to eat and to release or to contain are
dynamics present in the oral and anal phases respectively. Implicit in these dynamics is a
vacillating relationship to the object in which, at the extremes, the subject is dominated or
dominates. Kleinians place castration and the Oedipus Complex at a much earlier phase of
development than Freudians, and at times make links between the oral and the vaginal, and in
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turn between menstruation and the dynamics of the anal phase, as can be seen in Brierley’s 1936
paper Specific Determinants in Feminine Development:
over and over again I have found that the uncontrollability of the menstrual flow
is a very important feature. The woman who is menstruating is temporarily in the
position of the infant who cannot control her evacuations, and is subject to a
revival of the anxieties which attended the original establishment of sphincter
control. This monthly flow is an ever-recurring proof of the operation of
mysterious forces 'inside' which are not amenable to voluntary control (p.178179).
Brierley connects the tendency for woman to be “babyish” (1936, p. 178) to anxieties of the oral
and anal phases kept alive by menstruation, which activates conflicts between that which is bad
and must be expelled versus that which is good and must be retained, which puts menstrual
blood into the same position for psychic expression and analytic interpretation as feces with its
myriad symbolic meanings. The difference, which is not always explicated, is the additional web
of meaning menstruation’s relationship to reproduction evokes.
In a 1937 paper, A Contribution to the Psychology of Menstruation, Balint presents case
material that demonstrates menstruation’s resonance with anal phase activities as well as its
effects in the genital phase. Balint writes that menstruation “may be interpreted as a conversion
symptom, and consequently that it unites in itself different opposing wishes and instinctual
impulses” (1937, p. 346). He provides case examples of women having defensive irregular
periods, most frequently in connection to losing their virginity or being expected to have sex, as
well as menstruation as a substitute for sex, brought on in instances where sexual desires go
unmet. He likens menstruation to a male erection, explaining that menstruation can express
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unconscious ambivalence about sexual excitation and the need to repress it. He describes women
carelessly exhibiting evidence of their period with misplaced sanitary napkins, which he analyzes
as mistakes meant to arouse the desire of men. He labels a patient who does this an “impetuous
flirt” (1937, p.352) and another, who uses her period defensively to avoid sex as “safely
repressed” (1937, p.349). Here we see the conflicts of psychosexual development return in the
genital stage of adult sexual relations, where menstruation becomes another site for the cultural
stereotypes of the frigid wife or impossible hysteric to play out, the biological cycle both a
catalyst for and point of manipulation in the expression of psychic conflicts. In these depictions
of menstruation as reminder of castration, as triumph over castration, as vehicle for symptom
expression, and as heir to the early psychosexual stages, a derogatory tone pervades the clinical
observations—one that has long haunted depictions of the hysteric—further reducing the
experience of women and bolstering the theory of inferiority.
1932’s The Psychological Effects of Menstruation, by Mary Chadwick, addresses
something of the stigma female sexuality carries throughout society as it examines the many
dialectical meanings, behaviors, and social perceptions that have been ascribed to menstruation
over the centuries. Chadwick makes a connection between the hysterical women treated by
psychoanalysis and historic descriptions of witches and women of the occult, positing a link
between the pre-Oedipal maternal phenomena that the 1920s and 30s established as the new
frontier for analysis, and the pre-Christian, European maternal deities and fertility rights. She
argues that the defining features of the witch are also the characteristics of the menstruating
woman, marking categories of good witches and bad witches as distinctions between the
menstruating mother and the non-menstruating mother. The mother’s menstrual cycle is a
mysterious and powerful force that can disrupt the routine of the child when irritability and other
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symptoms appear. The child may see soiled garments or notice strange smells and blood in the
bathroom when searching to determine what is afoot with the mother. Chadwick links these
olfactory experiences with the frequent description of witch-hunters as being those with a
“wonderfully keen nose for witches,” who are known for “smelling out witches,”(1932, p. 29).
The witch represents all that is feared of the pre-Oedipal mother, who wields a kind of power
over elements of experience that cannot be readily explained. The young girl, who is subject to
her mother’s mysterious moods, whims, and power, and whose envy of her mother and
frustration in her own limited powers of creation, may develop a “belief in the power of her
death-wishes, spells and incantations, that she can carry out in connection with her belief in her
omnipotence of thought” (1932, p. 22). These pre-Oedipal psychical fantasies attach to stories of
witchcraft and become a point of identification and organization for destructive impulses.
Chadwick notes that among psychotic women, menstrual disturbances can be far more
pronounced, as the heightened awareness of the reproductive system, shedding of blood, and
historical religious associations connected to ideas of demons, witches, and spirits, can all create
a simultaneous confrontation with sex and death that is persecutory in nature. She closes her
study describing her choice to remove a particularly challenging psychotic woman from her
clinic after the patient spent hours ranting about the feelings in her body, her history of abuse,
and her desire to jump off the balcony. Recounting this scene, Chadwick remarks “that it might
have been the behavior of women during their menstrual period which made necessary the
prohibitions and limitations upon them in early times” (1932, p.50). Though insight is gained in
drawing a connection between women with menstrual disturbances and this history of
persecution, fascination, and fear that has followed the witch, for clinicians like Chadwick who
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work up close with this tangle of elements, putting this insight to use as clinicians is another
issue entirely.
Accounts like Chadwick’s, while bringing in a relevant historical dimension, do little to
disrupt the stalemate around female sexuality at the time and have gone mostly unassimilated in
psychoanalytic theory. A prime example can be found in the work of C.F. Daly, who is
mentioned in the previously cited footnote from Civilization and its Discontents, and who strived
to make his mark by placing menstruation at the heart of psychoanalytic theory. Daly challenged
the Freudian doctrine of castration as the bedrock of neurosis with the “menstruation complex,”
which he designated “the nucleus of the Oedipus complex” (1935, p. 340). The place and
meaning of Daly’s menstruation complex is somewhat ambiguous, as “at times it is an image of
castration, at times a developmental phase prior to castration anxiety” (Lupton, 1993, p.110).
Daly builds his theory with the Hindu goddess Kali in a 1927 paper, Hindu-Mythologie und
Kastrationkomplex, which is not translated into English but is summarized and analyzed in
Lupton’s Menstruation and Psychoanalysis. Kali is known as the goddess of retribution, who
represents processes of “creation, preservation, and destruction” (Lupton, 1993, p. 111). Kali is
often described in vivid, gory language, “dressed in blood red” and described sailing “on a sea
of blood,” (Lupton, 1993, p. 111), though according to Lupton, she is never consciously
associated with menstruation in Hindu mythology. The fear of Kali is the fear of the phallic and
castrating mother, a woman who is no longer passive, but instead aggressive. She is, like
Chadwick’s witch, the preoedipal mother, her blood arousing terror, repulsion and attraction.
Daly turned to Western literature in 1935’s The Menstruation Complex in Literature to
reveal the presence of the menstruation complex in the writing of Poe and Baudelaire,
identifying its presence in red imagery, as well as themes of attraction and repulsion, smells,
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sickness, and eventually death. Daly, an analysand of Freud, contends that these themes draw on
the intensity of everyday visceral experiences that he argues are the source of a primary incest
barrier, which theoretically obliterates the place of the father and for a third term. Daly argues
that the aggression and dynamics toward the father that appear for the young boy in his Oedipal
phase are transference of much earlier dynamics with the mother, whose reproductive functions
and their attending power are the first site of experiencing castration. Lupton notes that within
Daly’s work on menstruation, his focus remains on the young boy and his relationship to the
menstruating mother—not on menstruation itself in relation to female sexuality. Indeed, as
Daly’s work progresses, he moves further away from his depictions of Kali and the feminine
dimension of menstruation, instead focusing more on the relationship of his own theory to
Freud’s work in Totem and Taboo, as well as Freud’s passing recognition of his work in
Civilization and its Discontents.
In 1943’s The Role of Menstruation in Human Phylogenesis and Ontogenesis, Daly
further develops his theory of the menstruation complex, while defending what he believes to be
his misunderstood and neglected contributions. Daly pivots from myth and literature to the
realm of biology (and thus away from the unconscious), imagining the evolution of menstruation
from primate to human and the attending developments that occurred. Daly confronts Freud’s
reading of his theory in the Civilization and its Discontents footnote, specifically the myth that
man grew repulsed by the smell of menstruation as he developed upright posture and began to
rely predominately on his visual sense. Daly contends “that menstruation is a phylogenetic
source of pleasure” (1943, p. 160), as much as it is a source of horror and disgust that connects to
ideas of death in the unconscious. Daly contends that the menstrual cycle is one of both
attraction and repulsion with the ambivalence it engenders the source of the male aversion to
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female sexuality, the denial of femininity, and more fundamentally, the incest taboo. He
connects larger psychoanalytic ideas with menstruation, stating, for instance, that the reason the
girl fails to discover her vagina is a result of menstruation trauma, which includes exposure to
miscarriages and childbirth. For Daly, menstruation is the ultimate biological and bodily marker
of a femininity that becomes psychically repudiated. The link between menstruation and death
remains present throughout Daly’s work and is implicitly part of this repudiation. Daly’s theory
strives to define and ground itself in some biological truth about menstruation, and as a result
substitutes menstruation for the penis in the quest to define the biological site of psychical
castration. In his work to establish a single physical marker for sexual difference, Daly follows
the psychoanalytic model in all its errors, replicating the problems in which both sexes are
assessed according to the biological constitution of one.
Attempts to break away from the trap of anatomy can be found here and there in the
writings of many of the theorists discussed so far, with contributions ripe with ideas that
diverged from the Freudian script on female sexuality, though often still adhering to its structure.
A key perspective Horney adds to the discussion is the influence and effects of cultural forces on
the clinical interpretations of female sexuality. Drawing on the work of philosopher Georg
Simmel in 1926’s The Flight from Womanhood, Horney writes,
Our whole civilization is a masculine civilization…Like all sciences and
all valuations, the psychology of women has hitherto been considered only
from the point of view men…It is inevitable that the man's position of
advantage should cause objective validity to be attributed to his subjective,
affective relations to the woman, and according to Delius the psychology
of women hitherto does actually represent a deposit of the desires and
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disappointments of men. (p. 325- 326).
When reading the papers of this time, Horney’s perspective stands out for recognizing how any
understanding of women has been a product of the fantasies, “the desires and disappointments of
men.” Horney goes on to ask how much analysis has fallen prey to the phallocentric paradigm,
wondering “Are these facts so mysterious to us in girls only because we have always looked at
them through the eyes of men?” (1926, p. 326) Even when Horney’s argument was
acknowledged and considered, as in Ernest Jones 1927’s The Early Development of Female
Sexuality, the leap proved too far. Jones credits Horney’s observation and calls for
psychoanalysis to uncover the historic roots of masculine dominance, but in a move reminiscent
of Deutsch, he places the responsibility of the dynamic back with women:
Better still, it is to be hoped that analytic investigation will gradually
throw light on the nature of the prejudice in question and ultimately dispel
it. There is a healthy suspicion growing that men analysts have been led to
adopt an unduly phallocentric view of the problems in question, the
importance of the female organs being correspondingly underestimated.
Women have on their side contributed to the general mystification by their
secretive attitude towards their own genitals and by displaying a hardly
disguised preference for interest in the male organ (1927, p. 459).
Horney’s 1926 paper offers a response to Jones’ idea of the woman’s contribution to the
unknowns of female sexuality when she writes
An additional and very important factor in the situation is that women
have adapted themselves to the wishes of men and felt as if their
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adaptation were their true nature. That is, they see or saw themselves in
the way that their men's wishes demanded of them; unconsciously they
yielded to the suggestion of masculine thought (p. 326).
Horney considers that perhaps what appears as a woman’s true nature, like a “hardly disguised
preference for interest in the male organ,” or rape fantasies, or inherent, masochistic pleasure in
pain, is a result of women being subject to male dominance. Horney continues to put forth
alternative ideas as to what has produced the female subordinate position, suggesting that the
“greater average physical strength in men than in women,” is what leads to a “masochistic
female role” (1926, p. 257). She argues that rape fantasies, instead of being reflective of primary
female masochism, could instead by attempts at mastering a real or experienced threat. She cites
the “bloody or even painful processes,” including “menstruation, defloration, and childbirth”
(1926, p. 257) as events that later in life lead women to assume a more masochistic position.
Horney’s work reflects many of the ideas and contributions of her peers, but also puts forth
counter arguments against certain anatomical assumptions including the primacy of ideas like
penis-envy. An important difference is her determination to connect the clinical observations
and theories to a larger discourse in which women are as much a product of society as of their
anatomy.
Horney’s questions are another fragment in the body of female sexuality literature of the
time, but allow us to construct an understanding of the impossibility of finding, placing, and
holding onto menstruation in the theory. Daly’s work, of course, centers the repudiation of
female sexuality on men’s relationship to menstruation and when linked with Horney’s ideas, it
can be said that menstruation as repudiated substance and event that provokes a confrontation
with death, is far from pleasing or satisfying for the conscious desires of men and what they want
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women to be. But, just as with Chadwick’s dismissal of the clinical confrontation with
menstruation as lived, the question remains what to do with this insight. For Horney the way out
of the phallic stronghold is systematic research to account for the “the social conditionings in the
genesis of any sex-limited peculiarities” (1935, p. 241). She argues that totalizing statements
about femininity are based on a few case examples of patients, and do not account for the
population at large, and thus fail to address the variability inherent to the masses. She reaches
beyond the theoretical confines of psychoanalytic theory, asking for research from fields like
anthropology to offer data that could refute what clinically and intuitively she recognizes to be
untrue. This path of research, while no doubt important in certain disciplines, is the very thing
that pulls psychoanalysis away from its origins in the specificity of the subject’s unconscious that
upends the authority of science. It is a path that in many ways still leaves a question about how
to manage individuals in the clinic. There is a place for research and science, but it is a distinct
place from the singular work of analysis and what will become the Lacanian notion of the
feminine.
Psychoanalysis is pulled in different directions by different schools, with some
determined to make it a reputable science and others emphasizing its roots in the humanities. The
history of US psychoanalytic institutes ignores Freud’s decree of the importance of “lay analysis”
by making the field open only to medical doctors for most of the 20th century, setting the stage
for a more empirical, scientific branch to dominate. The effects on the discipline in the US have
been staggering as the pressure to meet the standards of medical research can be seen as part of
psychoanalysis’s failure to flourish and be seen as a viable treatment option throughout the
country. Many of the analysts discussed in this chapter influenced US institutes, where it has
proven theoretically difficult to move past the legacy of anatomical destiny and a strict adherence
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to a chronological and norm-based understanding of psychosexual development. The Freudian
discovery of the influence of childhood experience on adult neurosis is, of course, a core
contribution of psychoanalysis, but how this idea is implemented during the debates on female
sexuality creates the holding pattern analysts at the time were stuck in, as they pushed the
clinical material and theoretical material they encountered into this developmental perspective.
This approach implicitly makes the unconscious a static, fixed entity in need of excavation
through the layers of time, and not a dynamic phenomenon of the present in which the drives
play a vital role. Endless details and combinations can be supplied in research, where we can see
trends, predict possibilities, and make sense of certain phenomena past, but as the constant
revelations of the limitations of research studies reveal, no definite answer can be pinned down
given the infinite potential of each singular subject. It is precisely here that the work of the
analyst matters most.
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Chapter IV
A body in revolt, emotions surging, the rule of invisible cycles and processes that
can never be totally contained: with the common complaints of cramps, headaches, and
mood swings that foreground emotional conflicts and problems that suddenly become
intolerable, there is a tendency to label everything as physical, to insist that all suffering
is a result of some biological imbalance and so relief first and foremost will come via
medicine. Sometimes the medical interventions work and assuage the suffering;
sometimes the symptoms are quieted. But when symptoms have ripple effects
throughout the patient’s life and the search for a cure brings no panacea, the idea to seek
another kind of help leads the sufferer to a new position in which she is no longer just the
object of medicine but also the subject of her own investigations. An implicit question as
to what bearing does body have on mind and mind on body surfaces, and the relationship
to what can and cannot be known and controlled takes on new form.
How to think about and respond to questions arising in treatment that live at the
imagined mind-body divide? At times patients have explicitly asked my thoughts on this
matter, in others they have come describing their symptoms through the well-trodden
discourse of mental health with its frequent emphasis on the physicality of symptoms. In
many hospitals and clinics, often the first response is to simultaneously evaluate
symptoms of psychical suffering with a psychiatric consultation, the implication being
that we can separate the physiological origins of mental illness from the “dynamics” and
perhaps be even better to attend to the psychological realm if things are “stabilized” at a
physiological level. This is especially true with problems related to the menstrual cycle.
Investigating hormonal imbalances, seeing symptoms of anxiety and depression as a
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function of them, and responding in turn with hormonal and psychiatric interventions is
standard treatment for female reproductive suffering. These approaches firmly place the
menstrual cycle on the side of the biological organism, where it is easily observed and
treated. Given the material reality of the menstrual cycle, it has at times seemed futile to
approach Lacan’s body of spoken lectures and careful writings with specific questions
like “What is the place of menstruation in psychoanalysis?” and “How can the work of
analysis have an effect on this biological function?” And yet, the engagement with these
questions has been a conduit for approaching the various registers of experience through
which symptoms are formed and expressed, as well as important distinctions about what
kind of answers and interventions psychoanalysis can offer and those it cannot.
The theory contained in the decades of seminars Lacan taught and the writings he
published in the Ecrits have been transmitted to me through reading groups, supervision,
and lectures, and my own reading. Working through the enigmatic presentation and
serpentine development of Lacan’s ideas affects what I hear in the speech of the patient
and how I begin to situate menstruation at the imaginary, but persistently summoned,
border between body and mind for each patient. In reading Lacan to better address the
questions of a patient, as well as my own questions about menstruation, there is perpetual
vacillation between comprehension and clarity and confusion and obscurity, with
moments of liveliness and creation and others of distance and frustration. For all of the
challenges the theory presents, I have found grappling with complex concepts in Lacan’s
teaching and how to apply them generative to clinical practice.
Lacan reads Freud in a specific way, using Freud’s discoveries of unconscious
processes as the very tools for further developing his foundational theories. Lacan’s
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return to Freud begins with Freud’s early work on the study of dreams, jokes and
parapraxes, where he detailed the worlds of meaning and memory resting within
signifiers specific to the subject. Lacan builds on Freud’s discoveries of the unconscious
and connects them to 20th century structuralism, with attention to linguist Saussare’s work
on the signified and signifier and anthropologist Levi Strauss’s work on the symbols and
structures of myth, among many other scholars. The signifier may point at any given
time to something specific, including an object or a whole body of meaning, but it is
meaningless in and of itself—a word or utterance or other mark that without context
within a series of other signifiers becomes devoid of meaning. The narrowing of
psychoanalysis to the field of the signifier marks a firm boundary between
psychoanalysis and biology, psychoanalysis and psychiatry, psychoanalysis and
neuroscience, and so on, in terms of how the clinical work itself is done. Nonetheless,
Lacan’s inspirations and influences, from philosophy to mathematics to literature, span a
prolific range of time and topics. But as Lacan draws on these disciplines and systems of
knowledge, his work returns to the fundamental idea that it is language first and
foremost—as conceptualized through the relationship between the signifier and the
signified—that structures not only psychoanalysis, but most importantly, our subjective
reality and thus our relation to the material world.
The Lacanian analyst listens to how the chain of signifiers delivered in the
analysand’s speech delimits the subject’s relationship to truth, knowledge, and reality.
The analyst’s focus on the analysand’s signifiers is an organizing principle that allows for
the evenly suspended attention that makes way for the unexpected of the unconscious to
emerge and be heard. The primacy of the signifier is the basis from which topics like
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sexuality, drives, affect, transference and countertransference, and diagnosis are
considered. It is also the perspective from which to approach Lacan’s reinvention of
terms like the phallus, feminine and hysteric, which rather than suggesting markers based
in anatomy, point to positions and structures of the psyche and of social discourse that are
Lacan’s theoretical innovations. Though accused of perpetuating patriarchal discourse,
Lacan developed and specified the psychoanalytic vocabulary to draw out the bearing
sexual difference and our systems of language have on each other. The effect of Lacan’s
persistence with these terms is that they must be perpetually defined and worked through,
just as each individual must work through her own relationship to sexuality itself. In the
case of menstruation, while it may be categorized as simply a physical event, it is
nonetheless marked by a signifier with a relationship to a body of meaning (the signified)
that is unique to each subject and discourse, rendering questions about menstruation
contextual, case-by-case considerations. Lacan’s elaborations of Freudian theory and his
innovations, including, the three registers of the imaginary, symbolic and real, the
concepts of the phallus and of the feminine, and the relationships between the subject, the
unconscious, desire, symptoms, and language, will be explored and employed in this
chapter to address the question of menstruation. A representation of how these questions
manifest in the speech of the analysand and the analyst will appear in a vignette at the
end of the chapter.
To begin, the knotting of the three registers of the imaginary, symbolic and real is
central to Lacan’s conceptualization of how language structures experience and the
expression of symptoms. These registers provide useful points from which longstanding
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psychoanalytic conundrum can be reformulated, including the symptomatic deadlock in
discussions of female sexuality during the 1920s and 30s.
The imaginary is the realm of images, of perceptions of surface, of wholeness, of
autonomy, and of similarity. It is famously articulated in Lacan’s ideas on the mirror
stage and the specular image. It is the register in which humanity can observe biological
links to the animal kingdom, where signs in the animal’s coloring, scent, anatomy, and so
forth, elicit certain behaviors and responses. The effects of the imaginary can be seen in
expressions of aggression, rivalry, and competition, when confrontations with difference
arise and break the ideal of how things are supposed to be or look. It is a dimension that
generates fixed notions of meaning and response, and when dominating over the other
registers, can close off the polyvalence of the symbolic order for the subject.
The imaginary is in part structured by the symbolic, the register of the big Other,
which can be described as the system of signifiers, meaning, laws, and discourse that
moves through and around us. The symbolic is the register of differences. Each signifier
or mark is distinct from the next, distinguishing one thing from another, ever creating and
approaching the space/hole/or lack which drives language as speech. There is always
more to be said—and to be repeated— in relation to this place of absence in an attempt to
get at what is experienced as missing. The symbolic precedes and lives past us,
transmitting the world of laws of the Other that regulate how we express desire and
experience pleasure.
The final register, the real, bears its influence on the imaginary and symbolic
registers in that it encompasses the material that cannot be symbolized, but nonetheless
has a presence in symptoms. It is what is undifferentiated, immovable and potentially
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traumatic in the signifying system. While the symbolic and imaginary have their effects
on the real, something of the real always remains—not everything can be analyzed as not
everything can be seen or formulated through language. The real manifests when what is
repressed or foreclosed returns in symptoms. These registers are inextricably linked to
each other, visualized in Lacan’s later work by the Borromean knot. The knotting of
these registers produces a unique solution that Lacan terms the sinthome, a concept born
from the symptom that distinguishes itself as a kind of creation for each subject living in
all her particularity within a world ordered by the Other.
In Guiding Remarks for a Convention on Female Sexuality, a paper Lacan
originally delivered in 1960 and later published in the Ecrits, the utility of the symbolic,
imaginary, and real is demonstrated as Lacan takes on the history of female sexuality in
psychoanalysis, offering pithy yet complex responses to previous investigations of the
vagina, psychosexual developmental, frigidity, homosexuality, and castration, to name a
few. Early on Lacan poses the question driving early discussions of female sexuality:
“What libidinal pathways are assigned to women by the anatomically visible signs of
sexual differentiation among higher organisms?” (2006, p. 611). Lacan’s representation
of this question implicitly defines the entrenched problems in earlier theorizing of sexual
difference with the word “visible.” When we look at the female body and decide
something is missing, the observation relies on a symbolic system that determines how to
classify material reality. The notion that the female body is lacking a penis fixes
difference in the imaginary where competition and its many effects are produced.
Narratives constructed at the imaginary level attempt to master this difference with an
illusion of understanding and a totalizing view that are destined to be disturbed by the
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very nature of the ever-evolving symbolic register as it continuously reveals where these
narratives fall short. But these narratives nonetheless have powerful effects. Lacan writes
that the
representation…of female sexuality, whether it is repressed or not,
conditions its implementation, and its displaced emergences (in which the
therapist’s doctrine may turn out to be an interested party) seal the fate of
the tendencies, however naturally refined one assumes them to be (2006,
p.613).
Freud’s articulation of childhood sexual theories, beginning with the belief that everyone
has a penis, reflect and create systems of categorization with effects on how bodies are
treated and how these bodies are conditioned to respond—often unconsciously—to the
discovery that in fact not everyone does have a penis. Lacan’s theory releases us from the
confusion as to what the penis is (a piece of anatomy distinct from the phallus), and in
turn, marks castration not as merely a threat of the physical, but as something that
ultimately occurs at the symbolic level. The organism itself, whether male or female, is
missing nothing—it is the subject of language who experiences something missing as she
is born from the structural lack with which she must forever contend.
The distinction between the organism and the subject is an important one to note.
The organism is differentiated from the body, which is a construction of the psyche. As
Soler (1984) highlights about Lacan’s teaching, how the subject forms “the body” is
shown to be something other than corporality, something that is an imaginary entity built
on symbolic constructions as internalized by the subject. Soler gives two clinical
examples that illustrate the differences between the organism and the body, describing a
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schizophrenic who states “his head is a metre above his trunk,” noting that this statement
and experience of the man is having of his body “does not stop his organism from
retaining its unity” nor the doctor from observing the organism’s unity (1995, p. 4). Soler
identifies the “disjunction between the organism, the image of the body, and the body in
so far as it is caught up in the signifier”(1995, p.4)—the body as it manifests in the three
registers. She presents another bodily configuration in an example of a “hysteric with a
paralysed arm” (1995, p.4). Here she notes that the hysteric retains a body image that is
intact (unlike the schizophrenic who experiences his head as separated), while something
of her very organism is affected by the signifier. The clinician working with the
schizophrenic will see the organism intact and locate the problem in the patient’s
relationship to the symbolic, while with the hysteric, the clinician may see the
disturbance as originating from the organism before realizing the paralysis can only be
accessed through the symbolic.
Even with Lacan’s focus on the relationship of the signifier to the body, he
underscores in Guiding Remarks that the analyst should stay abreast of developments in
the field of medicine and how these might impact the organism and the subject. Lacan
notes the then recent discoveries of sex hormones including “the ordering of estrogen
metabolism in the menstrual phenomenon,” but warns that the analyst “must always be
reserved” (2006, p.611) when integrating new findings into clinical practice. As much as
the analyst should be attuned to issues that require the expertise of medicine, the work of
analysis remain focused on the unconscious. Nonetheless, the awareness of the analyst of
the limits to which disturbances of the body can be accessed and addressed by analysis is
equally important to maintain as a consideration. This is not a stance that supports the
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idea that analysis can cure all physical ailments, but instead, one that maintains a limit for
the analyst in terms of what she is in the position to address. When clinicians are pushed
into the position of being a “general expert” of mental health and the medicalized
psychological discourse, the ethics of psychoanalytic listening and work are
compromised as it is no longer the unconscious of the analysand that is engaged, but
instead the clinician’s supposed mastery of the knowledge du jour of what is normal and
healthy. Even if symptoms are rooted in the biological, there will inevitably be meaning
made about it that the analysand can examine and open to new perspectives. It is this
possibility that the analyst must maintain. When the analyst comes with fixed ideas
about the biological and anatomical underpinnings of a particular symptom or a particular
type of patient, impasses like those of the 20s and 30s arise and the space for the
analysand to define something for herself is threatened.
In order to think about menstruation in less concrete terms than those of the
anatomically focused analysts of the 20s and 30s, who treated it as part of an Oedipal
complex suffused with a fantasy of biological essentialism and thus as another marker of
castration in a more literal sense, it is important to walk through the Lacanian elaboration
of and departure from Freudian theory as it separates man and woman from masculine
and feminine and the organism from the subject. This requires an explication of the
Lacanian phallus, it’s relationship to the real of the body, and in turn in how a subject
comes to identify regardless of whether or not he, she, or they menstruate.
Freud posits that the female body is missing the penis. Lacan posits that the
inherent lack in the symbolic register is projected onto women, who become
representative of this missing thing that no one wants to know of. Lacan’s 1958 paper,
73

The Signification of the Phallus, published in the Ecrits, defines the phallus as the
signifier of all signifiers, born in the place of absence and the evanescent fill for the lack
no one wants to have. This lack, this absence, this hole, is the source of desire, the search
to resolve irresolvable separation and difference. Freud’s fort-da example in Beyond the
Pleasure Principle (1920) famously illustrates the signifier in relation to the mother’s
coming and going, the utterance a simultaneous stand-in for her presence and recognition
of her absence. While many things take on the phallic function (including the subject in
certain dynamics when attempting to be the object of desire for the other), Lacan clarifies
what the phallus is not: a fantasy (which he defines as an “imaginary effect”), an object
as the term tends to suggest a specific object in reality or a piece of an internal reality,
and “still less is it the organ—penis or clitoris—that it symbolizes” (2006, p.
579). Lacan’s development of the idea of the phallus as a signifier releases analysts from
the strictures of this anatomically focused perspective, to access a fundamental structure
to which speaking beings are subject.
The phallus as signifier emerges when a need is translated through the Other,
creating a split, where “what is thus alienated in needs constitutes an Urverdrangung
[primal repression], as it cannot, hypothetically, be articulated in demand; it nevertheless
appears in an offshoot that presents itself in man as desire” (Lacan, 2006, p.
579). Anything that can be presented as a demand or need comes through the language
of the Other and leaves a remainder—a piece unique to the subject that is untranslatable
and unattainable. The subject searches to reclaim this piece, but is confined to the terms
of the Other, making the subject’s search to reclaim the phallus a constant reach for
things that are not quite “it.” The phallus marks the split or division in the subject
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between what she searches for and what she can actually articulate of it. The phallus as
the signifying mark of the relationship between language and desire gives an illusory
resolution to the world of impossibilities, difficulties, illusions, and determined searches
to find what will always, by its very existence in relation to language and desire, be
impossible to resolve. By these definitions the phallus appears as the solution to what is
missing, but paradoxically is also the marker of the universal experience of castration.
Building on Freud’s work on the Oedipus complex, Lacan marks three instances in
Seminar V (2017) in which the subject’s relation to the phallus develops. These three
structuring moments involve a confrontation with castration—with absence, lack and
difference—that lead to the sexuation of the subject, the Oedipal event in which the
subject confronts her own limits and the limits of the Other in a quest to determine what
makes a man a man and a woman a woman.
Initially the child is entirely dependent on the mother or caretaker, who is the first
other/Other. The child’s growth and development depend on the mother’s desire to care
for the child. The first structuring moment of the Oedipal complex is the child’s
identification with the phallus in that the child seeks to become what the mother wants,
that which dictates the mother’s presence and absence. The fact that the mother desires
indicates that she is lacking something, that she is castrated. The phallus is thus the first
signifier for what the mother lacks, for her castration and for her desire, which in turn
becomes the desire of the child. The second Oedipal moment occurs with the recognition
of the mother desiring something beyond the dyad, leading to the emergence of a third.
The mother’s desire for something else is proven in the very fact that she speaks of
something that is not there. This is where Lacan’s term Name-of-the-Father becomes
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relevant as a metaphoric substitute for the phallus and what comes to be seen as the law
that dictates the expression of the mother’s desire. It becomes a symbolic presence that
regulates the child’s access to the mother, delineating what is allowed and what is
prohibited. Lacan marks the third structuring Oedipal moment as the point when the child
pairs the mother’s desire for the phallus with an actual person, often the father. This is
the point at which the phallus and the law it marks may be identified with the actual penis.
This is the structuring point from which recognition of a gap between the symbolic
Name-of-the-Father and the actual person as one who is limited and lacking converge
pathogenically. In locating the phallus with a real person and a real organ, the experience
of castration and sense of inadequacy affects both male and female subjects as there is
recognition that not only are they not the phallic object of desire for the mother, but also
they do not possess what she wants; someone else has it, but with time it becomes clear
that what this someone else has is different from what it is imagined to be.
Within this three part structuring, the phallus appears as an ever evolving signifier
of the mother’s castration, of her desire and her lack—something mysterious children
search to be, locate, and feel themselves to either have and be afraid of losing (in the
masculine identified position) or to have lost and want to regain (in the feminine
identified position). Even if the phallus is a signifier that is not reliant on physical
anatomy, Lacan writes in The Signification of the Phallus that nevertheless, it is
“especially difficult to interpret in the case of women and with respect to women” (2006,
p. 576), remarking that it is the problematic phallic phase in women that “has since been
left tacitly intact, interpreted by everyone however he likes”, to which he credits in
Guiding Remarks the “lifelessness of psychoanalysis” (2006, p. 612). Lacan asks why it
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is the little girl who often considers herself castrated, why the primordial mother is
considered to be phallic by both boys and girls, and why it is the clitoris that is
characterized by the “imaginary dominance of the phallic attribute and masturbatory
jouissance” (2006, p. 576). He also questions why psychoanalytic theory purports there
is no psychic awareness of the vagina until the end of the Oedipus complex. These
questions lead Lacan to comment on the many theorists of the 20s and beyond who
countered these claims and debunked the psychoanalytic narrative of female sexuality.
Lacan notes that the persistence of these questions reflects the fact that much of female
sexuality remains a mystery, even to women analysands themselves, suggesting an issue
that transcends the knowable realities of female anatomy.
In 1975’s Seminar XX, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and
Knowledge, Lacan demystifies aspects of the effects of anatomy on the psyche when he
writes,
Don’t talk to me about women’s secondary sexual characteristics because,
barring some sort of radical change, it is those of the mother that take
precedence in her. Nothing distinguishes woman as a sexed being other
than her sexual organ (1998, p. 7).
The sexual organ is what constitutes fundamental difference. The sexual characteristics
ascribed to women beyond that are formed in relation to the first other, the primary
caretaker, most commonly the mother. Any phenomenon of the female anatomy is
interpreted through a construction of body created in this primary relationship. In
addressing the effects of anatomy on the girl’s relationship to the phallus, Paola Mieli
explains in Femininity and the Limits of Theory (2001) that the little girl’s shared
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anatomy creates an imaginary sense of “proximity” to the mother’s body, with this
imaginary identification fostering the envy and jealousy observed between women
throughout analytic literature. Mieli writes that this shared anatomy “inscribes” the little
girl within the Oedipal dynamic distinctly from boys in that the girl is both identified and
rivalrous with the mother, a relationship of ambivalence to the first imaginary Other that
can characterize her relationship to other objects. This imaginary proximity to the
mother’s body, with the ambivalent desire to both conquer it and be loved by it, along
with the desire to attain the phallus, which the girl sees as exterior to herself and her
mother, creates what Mieli describes as a “structurally double” relationship to sexuality
and to jouissance. Meanwhile, the imaginary endowment of “having it” disposes those
identified as men with an intrinsic sense of possessing wholeness. For women this
illusion of wholeness in men appears as something outside of them as women, something
they are not completely a part of. It is also through the imaginary identification with
anatomy that a certain “destiny” might seem determined, the anatomical female
positioned to have a more central relationship to femininity. Mieli succinctly explains
the relationship between anatomy, thought, the phallus, and femininity:
Whereas men are prone to perpetuate an illusion of wholeness attributing
to their penis the symbolic value of the phallus and imposing their phallic
illusion as a remedy for their endless castration anxiety, women generally
are faced with their being ‘a non-whole’ early on. In this respect they are
favored in unveiling the illusory premises of every discourse of wholeness
(2001, p. 7).
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By virtue of their anatomy women are seen and treated as what Lacan describes as “notwhole” or lacking, their very being an existential confrontation with the lack and limits of
the symbolic order. Though the historic mysteries of female sexuality came to symbolize
this ineffable dimension of the signifying system, they are but one of many pieces of
experience and existence that all speaking beings confront in the real.
The singular “woman” in Lacan’s famous formulation “woman does not exist”
(1990, p. 60) speaks to the idea of moving past the sexed organ to the realization that
woman is infinite things and no one thing: we cannot say there is a universal woman, nor
can we say there is a universal man (or a universal menstrual cycle, for that matter).
Freud describes ego functions that seek, however, to name a universal, to revise
inconsistencies, cover gaps in theory and speech, and make sense of the paradoxical.
Mieli describes these ego functions as part of the privileging of the phallic, of “messianic
thought” that promises a full answer, as well as the source of the negative portrayal and
debasement cast on lack and the feminine. The hysterical subject’s relationship to truth,
desire, and authority is forever showing the lack in the master’s discourse, pushing to
reveal the impossibility of forming a complete theory or a total woman. For the analyst
who is not tied to anatomy or to gender essentialist perspectives, the therapeutic process
fosters a relationship to the feminine for the subject, a hystericization of the subject’s
discourse. As Mieli writes, “femininity indicates how a part of oneself can be
experienced as escaping symbolization” (2001, p.7), rendering femininity a condition of
and possibility for any subject, regardless of anatomy.
Returning to Lacan’s observation that something mysterious in female sexuality
remains—something that is a mystery to women themselves—the contrast between the
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feminine and the phallic can be further examined. The phallus sits at a paradoxical
juncture with the feminine. While the phallus is the signifier of lack, it also serves at the
imaginary level as a marker of wholeness, of completeness. The subject of the symbolic
order receives a limit on access to the mother’s body and to an imaginary fantasy of full
jouissance. But when this fantasy is revealed again and again to be unattainable, the
phallus as a marker of lack signals the pathway to feminine jouissance—to a jouissance
that cannot be named. Feminine jouissance as Lacan terms is something supplementary
that belongs to the domain of the real, which is beyond the phallus and symbolization. It
like the phallus, is elusive, fleeting, an experience that swells and falls away, but to which
access remains possible.
Feminine jouissance, woman, and sexual difference are marked as questions never
answered in the unconscious—as signifiers of that which cannot be symbolized. In
Seminar V, Lacan links the problem of recognizing sexual difference in the unconscious
with the impossibility of representing the biological processes of reproduction and death:
The two sides, male and female, of sexuality are not given data, are
nothing that could be deduced from experience. How could the individual
situate himself within sexuality if he didn’t already possess the system of
signifiers, insofar as it institutes the space that enables him to see, at a
distance, as an enigmatic object, the thing that is the most difficult to
access, namely his own death? This is no more difficult to access, if you
think about it, if you think precisely of the long dialectical process
necessary for an individual to accomplish it, and of the extent to which our
experience consists of too much and too little in one’s access to the male
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and female poles—a reality that may make us wonder whether it’s so
much as graspable outside the signifiers that isolate it (2017, p. 249).
The place of death in the question of sexual difference is also a question of origins as
much as it is endings. This is the constellation of questions every discipline struggles to
understand. How the subject relates to the phallus, in its marking of difference and the
unknown, manifests through defenses of repression (in neurosis), disavowal (in
perversion), and foreclosure (in psychosis) which stand as the primary diagnostic
categories in Lacanian theory. While the phallus is had by none, the neurotic masculine
position represses this lack, suturing it with a conviction of mastery and “having it” that
also attempts to deny the idea of death. The poles of difference between life and death
and man and woman become equated in psychoanalysis and elsewhere with experiences
of activity and passivity, presence and absence, and masculinity and femininity. How
we construct sexual positions and a relationship to death is a process of identifications
and relationships to definitions of man and woman enacted and enforced for better or
worse in the external world—and yet, these identifications do not fully resolve the
problem of sexual difference for the individual subject.
Menstruation is a function of the sexual organ, but like any other function is
interpreted through the first other, who herself is constituted through the Other. With
menarche, monthly periods, and menopause a confrontation with the designation of
womanhood arises, bringing the struggle between feminine and masculine positions and
awareness of time passing—of life and death—to the fore. If it is not simply culture, but
instead this structure of language that produces the feminine, we can see the cultural
treatment of menstruation as rooted in this fundamental symbolic structure with its
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castrating and generative limits. The representations of menstruation throughout history,
including the history of psychoanalysis, are haunted by this specter of death and the
attempts to master it through phallic theorizing. As the ego works in the domain of the
imaginary, using repression to mask and silence that which contradicts and provokes
confusion and conflict, menstruation has historically destabilized the ego’s work,
introducing an element of the real to consciousness that cannot be so easily
repressed. The non-whole nature of the feminine allows us to address what can and has
been said about menstruation and reposition ourselves to hear something beyond this
basic knowledge. Anatomy appeared to be destiny for centuries in Western culture, but
the promise of psychoanalysis is that something of these constricting systems of
knowledge can be removed, as other possibilities and ways of experiencing and defining
lack, absence, and the unknown open, leading the way to experience a pleasure that is not
constrained by fears of what is repressed in the unconscious.
In many ways what Lacan suggests early on in Guiding Remarks is as simple and
obvious (in that it is rooted in Freud’s fundamental tenets) as it is perception altering. Our
place as analysts is not to try to define women by their developmental and biological
experiences, but instead to elicit the unconscious and desire as articulated through the
mechanics of speech, where the idiosyncratic language of the analysand weaves between
the external and internal, between tenses of past, present, future, between activity and
passivity, and between masculinity and femininity. If any subject constructs the body
according to fundamental relationships to language and knowledge, the analyst must take
time to attend to the symptoms, i.e. the subjective expressions of the body, listening for
processes, identifications, and relationships to the Other that exist according to another
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time and another place in the unconscious. Menstruation is but one of many examples of
a biological function on the side of the organism that we must consider in its own right,
but with a focus on biological explanations we can construct fantasies that extend beyond
the psychoanalytic field of work. What analysts can determine about female sexuality
comes from moving away from the longstanding question/fixation on the sexual anatomy
of a woman and the standard tropes of what makes a woman, to what the subject
expresses about it in analysis—this is a powerful pathway from that which is immutable
about the organism to the possibility in the fluidity of the symbolic. In looking at the
phenomenon of menstruation, we also must look into this place of how it exists in the
signifying system, its treatment specific to diagnostic structures and the implicit questions
they ask of the Other.
The declaration “You are now a woman” reverberates through clinical work with
individuals who have not defined a unique subjective position in relation to this
pronouncement. The arrival of a period each month makes waves, sometimes tsunami
like, and opens channels into an unexamined living history that as a clinician interested in
the topic of menstruation, I address through theory brought to life via the analysand’s
speech. A narrative emerges, layers of voices and experiences speaking to and attempting
to nullify the messages, the identifications, and the fixed meaning of this monthly
reckoning. To close this chapter, here is one of these narratives—a clinical vignette that
reflects an interweaving of the speech of analysands as well the theoretical overlay that
informs what I hear in their speech:
They said it was PMS, they said it was the thyroid, they said it was fibroids, now
Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder— no matter the physical diagnosis, it’s a monthly
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sentence, a biweekly resurgence and then a collapse. Two weeks of forgetting—of
almost feeling like a man—clear, clinical, unsentimental, critical—able to execute with
efficiency. And then the irritation mounts, pangs of paranoia—this affliction comes from
something beyond and it works to destroy me and all that I value. Wounding words fly, a
landscape of destruction left behind. And then the blood. There is no escape from being
a woman.
The first period—who to tell? No one. Whose body is this? Not mine. One foot in
front of the other. Follow the instructions and proceed as normal. This is a condition of
women. Point out all the women who have it. She has it. And she does as well. How do
they each bear this burden invisibly? Are each of them just as alone with it?
Mute, stunned, shocked. The secret exposed. Traces deciphered and supplies
silently arrive. But no one came to the bedside with a thermometer, tea, and soothing
words for what really feels like an illness. Unlike other times, there is no story told, no
memories summoned to soothe and connect. All the women here have it but not even that
is said. Who even cares? No one to mark this mark. Silently screaming about that which
no one speaks of.
Embarrassment—hampered, hindered, barred—this word every time things get a
bit too close. Embarrassment here while speaking about these memories of periods,
when what is forgotten comes flooding back. What was it that was said last time? Can’t
remember, but there was a dream of a very old childhood friend—she came to visit me
last month. And then I saw you, my analyst—embarrassment at the point of recognition
and again embarrassment at not being recognized. This is not something I want to know.
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To be seen here bleeding, to in turn be called a woman, to be given a prescription
for femininity. A woman nurses, a woman sacrifices, a woman nurtures all but herself. Is
that why You were silent when my time had come? Was this the lesson of womanhood to
learn: A woman bears these matters of the body alone. At the very points where
difference emerged irrevocably with breasts and a period, denial silenced any words that
could say more, that could let this blood mark more than a final ruling. In the very habit
and culture of being a woman, the freedom of the feminine was never accessed. This
silence renders the nurturing of others, the performance of a singular womanhood, of
You mothering me, hollow.
For so long I was found elsewhere. In all the things He does and can be. I too
feel the pull to dominance, to control, to think logically. I can build, reason, argue and
be forceful. I teach myself to do all that He does, to be what You want. But each time my
cycle moves through its phases, a flooding of something nameless surges and it is
damning. My place was forced with the first drops of maturity. That doesn’t mean the
choice is accepted. A rage envelops those weeks when Your feminine cannot be escaped.
I cannot help but be like You. In this gender vise there is only one way to be a woman—it
is a phallic idea of the feminine. Lesser than, managing, responsible, beholden, keeper of
the superficialities, of the animal, burdened by that which men can escape.
This imaginary woman with her antiquated ways is what must be wholly rejected.
In physique, in love, in work. When pulled to curves, roundness, fullness and weight, and
a longing to embrace—an about face must be made. Erase those lines. Spit out that food.
What was just being said? What happened when last we spoke? Cannot remember. I
think I need to stop this treatment. Every point becomes riddled with a confrontation
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with the tensions between that which You are and that which I’d rather be. Even when
sometimes I want You, when I notice Your presence in my ways, I refuse to take refuge or
comfort. I must keep the edge hard.
And yet each month when those pains begin to stir, the real shakes and it returns.
I hear what You never said. I try to construct what You implied. What You made known
only through the how, the quality, the texture of your performance as woman. There is
no other woman but You.
So if You are this way, the rebellion will be the opposite. To have and be all that
You are not. To have and be what He is. But this too fails for there is always this blood
marking what is not there, what cannot be had of either woman or man.
A slow puncturing of the real with the symbolic—a symbolic hole in the real? For
so long it came as a shock each time, a surprise. Untracked, pushed from consciousness,
the complaints of all the sensations and emotional lability bore no conscious connection.
And then, slowly, some recognition. Putting a name to it didn’t immediately assuage
anything though. It just brings forth this swell of memory, these moments to painfully
recount. What is the point? With time maybe they can be forgotten, this body no longer
the battleground for a choice that had everything to do with what You and He told me,
not always with words, was possible.
I didn’t want to know anything of it. Now that I see it, now that I schedule it, it
consumes me. It haunts me. Is any of this time my own? Caught between these fantasies
of death and life, of barrenness and regeneration, of a lunar cycle that follows a calendar
unto itself, until... Whose time is it anyway? What laws must be followed if not the laws
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of nature? There is the promise of science. But it too is subject to a force that proves that
the law is never final, even as it tries to break that rule, pushing the end off, until…
Each cycle, a waste, a curse, a blessing, a relief—but usually just an event with
no lasting significance. Initially it seems so important. The belief that declaring “It’s
that time of the month” to the world will somehow explain and ease the way through the
upheaval, the upset, the mess. Isn’t this the source of everything? Can it be the
explanation for the intensity all life’s problems take on? Can this event excuse actions
gone awry? A sound defense for periodic madness?
Early on this period is barely wanted—a disruption to moving through youthful
explorations unscathed. And then later, when the desire to make something rises up, it is
looked to anew and dreaded as never before. At most points, such a nuisance, as is its
uncomfortable, awkward, painful, and departure—the process of it ceasing to return
again. Here again, gone for now, gone from this reproductive life, but not signaling death
yet, just the death of that. Will I have bled enough and in the right moments to continue
forward? Will I have translated Your cyclical suffering, Your repetitions, into something
that flows with blood and lives on separately?
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Chapter V
“The hysteric writes nothing” write Catherine Clement and Helene Cixous in
1975’s The Newly Born Woman, “for the hysteric does not write, does not produce, does
nothing—nothing other than make things circulate without inscribing them” (2008, p. 37).
What are these “things” of the hysteric that circulate? Repressed truths of the female
anatomy that for one reason or another were impossible to speak? Throughout history,
the experiences of female anatomy generally were not recognized and articulated by the
subjects who experienced them first hand. Men described women, permitting and
acknowledging only certain versions of experience, while denying the emergence of
unexpected truths. The hysteric, with her particular relationship to truth, nonetheless
found a way to transmit the paradoxes and ambiguities of her experience via the body.
With the discovery of the unconscious and psychoanalysis, the analyst and analytic space
carved a path from this state of cryptic somatic expressions to the potential for acts of
inscription and of creation.
Psychoanalytic processes and artistic creations of individual subjects who have
brought something unique to the collective discourse on menstruation will be considered
in this final chapter. Whether encountered at the individual or social level, the signs,
symptoms, and fragmented communications found in these creations reveal something of
the circuit of the drive—a psychical, linguistic representation of a physical force that
emerges from the body, is dispelled into the outside world and returned with new
meaning back to its originator. This circuit mobilizes the potential for new
interpretations and experiences for those for whom meaning has been fixed as well as for
those yet to define a position at all.
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An account of the journey from static somatic symptom to kinetic inscription can
be found in Marie Cardinal’s 1975 work, The Words to Say It, an autobiographical novel
of her seven-year psychoanalysis. Interpretation and the world of theory that attempts to
explain the psychic processes that lead to change are not the focus of this narrative.
While the work of analysis is vividly depicted (including the transference, the analyst as
consistent presence attuned to hear “something else” in the patient’s speech, as well as
the return of memories and feelings that are as vital as when they first happened), the
account is singularly Cardinal’s construction of a personal and family history of existing
at the nebulous borders of nationality, class, race, language, and sex. What can be
witnessed at a broader theoretical level is Cardinal’s transformation from passive victim
ruled by the disinterested diagnoses of medical and psychiatric doctors to subject who
defines her own position in her relation to her family history, her symptoms, and her
work as a writer.
The conflicts and traumas of the personal and social conditions of Cardinal’s
position between Algeria and France, between divorced mother and father, between sick
and well, and between life and death, manifest at the supposed site of her womanhood,
her reproductive anatomy. Upon beginning analysis she has experienced an incessant
flow of blood for three years, been diagnosed with uterine fibroids, and undergone two
curettages. Still the blood will not stop. Droplets and puddles of blood trail her, her
presence and absence marked by shameful stains. Her life is spent obsessively tracking
the ebb and flow of blood, its darkening and lightening, its changing textures and smell.
She grows terrified of leaving her home, of doing anything but monitoring and
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controlling the blood flow. Cardinal’s physical symptoms become bound with a psychic
presence she names “the Thing”:
The Thing, which on the inside was made of a monstrous crawling of
images, sounds, and odors, projected in every way by a devastating pulse
making all reasoning incoherent, all explanation absurd, all efforts to order
tentative and useless, was revealed on the outside by violent shaking and
nauseating sweat (2003, p.10).
The Thing overtakes her capacity to think and to put into words what ails her. Because
the blood is material reality, unlike the psychic pain no one can see, she observes, “I
loved to make it the center of my illness” (2003, p. 4). Medical treatments focus solely
on the blood as well, just as her psychiatric treatments treat the physical symptoms of her
psychic distress. Medications for managing the bleeding and the Thing allow her to do
her duties as a wife and mother for periods of time, but Cardinal struggles as the drugs
merely quiet the problems and only temporarily staves off attacks. At nearly 30 years old
a hysterectomy is recommended. She refuses the procedure without understanding her
reasons for doing so. She is hospitalized at a psychiatric institute. She refuses her
medication. Through analysis she realizes,
I had been subjected to dozens of tests and there had never been any
evidence to indicate something abnormal in the various bodily
functions...no gynecologist, psychiatrist or neurologist had ever
acknowledged that the blood came from the Thing. On the contrary I was
told the Thing came from the blood. ‘Women are often “nervous” because
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their gynecological equilibrium is precarious, very delicate’ (2003, p. 3334).
Cardinal discovers the bearing that words have on the Thing and the Thing on words,
writing of the persecutory effect of words and phrases like “fibroid uterus” on her
vulnerable state:
For the mentally ill, words, like objects, are as much alive as people or
animals. They palpitate, they vanish or expand. Passing through words is
like walking in a crowd. Faces stay with you, as silhouettes which quickly
fade from memory, or else as images that stick there, one doesn’t know
why. For me at that time, a word isolated from the mass of other words
started to live, becoming an important thing, becoming perhaps even the
most important thing, inhabiting me, torturing me, never leaving me,
reappearing in my dreams, waiting for me to wake up (2003, p.8).
The words of the doctors, fixated on her physical symptoms infect her just as strongly as
the condition of her uterus. Her analyst’s attention to her words, the flow of which had
been blocked and prohibited, yields a different result.
Cardinal’s analytic work begins with her on the couch in the fetal position and
brings an “opening up of the mind” that she likens to the process of being born. In telling
her analyst of her condition in the first sessions, he asks simply how she feels apart from
her illness. She tells him she is afraid. When returning for her next session she begins by
saying she is “bled dry” and attempts to communicate her wretched state through
descriptions of her bodily symptoms, but receives the following reply: “Those are
psychosomatic disorders. That doesn’t interest me. Speak about something else” (2003, p.
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32). This interpretation comes along with strict rules to not medicate herself even with
aspirin—a rigid analytic stance that relies on the power of speech to cure. The analyst
dismisses her fixation on the blood, and soon, she finds herself speaking, the words
flowing just as profusely as the blood and just as powerfully as the Thing. Cardinal finds
“the flow” of words “to construct the bridge which would join the intense to the calm, the
clear to the obscure” (2003, p. 3) and begins to define a position for herself in the
recounting of once chaotic events. She determines that The Thing emerged at the time of
her marriage, in the passage from girlhood to womanhood and is rooted in fears of
death—in memories of loss, pain, illness, and the undeniable message that, in fact, her
mother had never wanted her to be born. The open wounds of childhood had not healed
when it was time to become a woman, to step into a new name and a new position. These
discoveries of the unconscious form a narrative in the symbolic that structures what had
overwhelmed and terrorized Cardinal in the real. Returning to Cardinal’s depiction of the
power of words on the mentally ill, it could be said that the work of analysis redefines the
signified in relation to the signifier, creating new possibilities for words to connect to
other possible meanings and be bled dry of the torturous and persecutory qualities they
once held. A question forms as to how to conceptualize from a Lacanian perspective the
forces at play in this singular narrative of the clinic that nonetheless paves the way to
theory, especially a theory of how the real of female anatomy bears on the symbolic and
imaginary dimensions of womanhood. However the analyst conceptualized his position
in relation to Cardinal and however he used diagnosis to shape his interventions, it is
evident that Cardinal’s work is that of pushing toward, of circling round that which is
most unbearable, that place where there is no center.
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In 2008’s The Law of the Mother, Genevieve Morel writes that in Lacan’s later
work of the 1970s, the notion of lack and lack-in-being—the point from which the
analyst must work in relation to—took on new form with Lacan’s exploration of the
Borromean knot, a model not entirely reliant on speech to demonstrate the coming
together of the symbolic, imaginary and real (RSI) registers. With Lacan’s appropriation
of the knot as a model, the elusive real could be accessed through live showings of how
the symbolic, imaginary and real come together in the tying of the knot—a psychical
construction made through trial and error and a combination of thought and action until
arriving at a solution that holds. The real of the knot refers to that which has the potential
to change, shift, be broken, and adjusted. The imaginary refers to that which denotes
consistency, to the forms that hold shape and let us make a “whole” of a mass of things.
The symbolic, which previously carried the definition of the lack that marks difference,
becomes in this new model the “hole” that allows the knot to be tied together. The hole,
Morel writes, is a property of the symbolic “because the signifier makes a hole in the real,”
explaining “that Lacan, unlike Freud, did not believe in the constructive power of speech:
‘The symbolic turns round and round and only consists in the hole it makes by doing
this’ ” (2019, p. 65). Morel goes on to describe how when the analysand speaks, it is not
necessarily what is said or the content that is important, but instead what it delimits of the
hole her words circle around. The loop of the real contains life itself while the symbolic
loop encompasses death—that unfathomable known at the heart of repression and of all
symbolic communication. Thus, it could be said that the very act of speaking is an act of
delimiting life that cannot escape the ultimate ending—despite the infinite nature of
desire and the signifying chain. This is simultaneously devastating and liberating.
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In the case of Cardinal, an unstoppable menstrual flow marks neither the end of a
cycle nor the beginning of another, but instead the confounding paradox of a life that is
bound to death. Initially, the real dominates Cardinal’s symptom expression, which is
transformed when redirected through words (which by their very nature confront this
paradox). Her analyst’s encouragement to speak beyond the material reality of her
bleeding brings Cardinal to the point of articulating the idea of death repressed in the
unconscious, which is the bridge between the real and the symbolic registers. This bridge
is evidenced by the fact that signifiers have an effect on symptoms that are born out in the
real. While the overall result of Cardinal’s treatment is the creation of a narrative that
reflects a relationship to writing, this is but a piece of the process of change.
Transformation emerges word by repeated word—drop by drop—and may never be
acknowledged as having a discernible effect by the speaker, as what comes to be may
never quite meet the fantasy of what could or should be. Morel articulates the effects of
the signifier on the symptom, of the work of the symbolic on the real, not as a result of a
narrative construction, but as something more fragmented and inherently connected to the
hole in the symbolic and that which cannot be known of death. The symptom, she
explains, is reduced through “equivocations” or interpretations, whose ambiguous
meaning touch on “fragments of the real” (2019, p.69). Exposure over time to the
multiplicity of meanings offered through analytic interpretation drains the signifiers of
their charge and their hold on the symptom. This is a departure from the Freudian idea
that it is the narrative interpretation that transforms the symptom (what earlier Lacan
described as a symbolic registering and traversing of a fundamental fantasy) to the idea
that change can occur in pieces, without the necessity of narrative construction. Morel
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writes, “It is not the ‘construction of the self,’ nor of one’s internal life, that can be
glimpsed on the horizon of analysis, but rather the material reduction of the symptom by
means of the equivocal signifier” (2019, p. 72). Through the new loop of the sinthome, a
subject “ ‘trapped’ in a particular knot” (2019, p.72) creates a new solution for living
with less suffering, and even with creativity, regardless of structural diagnosis. This does
not eliminate the place or importance of narrative for some analysands. Cardinal’s written
memoir demonstrates both the work of interpretive equivocation and narrative
construction in addressing her pathological experience of womanhood. The reader is
taken through not just the fragmented memories of the menstrual blood as it invaded her
everyday life, but also the meaning that she constructed in relation to it. Cardinal’s
analysis could be described as a process of recognition and in turn, mourning, in its
implicit encounter with the hole in the symbolic that marks death, the unconscious
knowledge of which reverberated throughout Cardinal’s life.
The woman’s life cycle Freud describes from menstruation to marriage to
menopause, reflects the physical and social events of womanhood that act as both curse
and cure, bringing tension to the RSI knot with their contradictions. The first menses
reclassifies the girl as “the virgin,” who soon needs marriage and the sexual intercourse it
promises to cure her hysterical symptoms. But soon, marriage and motherhood become
the source of her suffering. Menopause brings a change that may help, but really, as
Freud states the only “real help” is death. The Greek notion of the pharmakon, that which
is “remedy, poison, and scapegoat,” encapsulates the paradoxical nature of Freud’s (and
of history’s) prescriptions for the conflated conditions of womanhood and hysteria.
Derrida’s discussion of the pharmakon in Dissemination articulates how that which “is
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supposed to produce the positive and eliminate the negative does nothing but displace
and at the same time multiply the effects of the negative, leading the lack that was its
cause to proliferate” (1981, p.100). There is clinical wisdom to this statement that
psychoanalysis puts into practice in attending to instead of turning away from that which
the defenses of the unconscious work to protect. This is not to say that the analyst
emphasizes the negative. In striving to hold a position of neutrality the analyst leans
toward neither positive nor negative, but produces a backdrop for better observing the
breaks and openings in speech that are often structured to avoid new territories and thus
unexpected confrontations with death in the symbolic. For Cardinal, the poison and
scapegoat were the strictures of womanhood and femininity, both personal and cultural,
by which she was confined. Her remedy was found in addressing the messages of the
other/Other and redefining womanhood and her femininity in her own terms. This work
began by linking the overwhelming and horrific real of the female anatomy with the
fragments that circulate throughout the discourse of the symbolic Other.
Clement and Cixous contrast the hysteric who cannot write anything with the
sorceress, who “makes partial objects useful, puts them back in circulation—properly”
(2008, p. 36). The refuse of the body, the “wastes: nail clippings, menstrual blood,
excrement, a lock of hair; these scraps of the body are what will act as a charm” (2008,
p.35). The sorceress transforms the partial objects categorized as waste into objects of
desire. Similarly, the analyst attends to what is dismissed and refused in the speech of the
patient, not letting the fragments of speech be discarded, but instead using them as a tool
to open the path of desire. Both sorceress and analyst reconfigure the laws that define
and govern what is most intimate of the body, the power of their processes hinging on
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that which is rejected and refused by the psyche. In Powers of Horror (1982), Julia
Kristeva terms those uncanny aspects of anatomy and body that are rejected as foreign to
the ideals that define woman and man as the “abject.” “The abject,” Kristeva writes, “has
only one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I” (1982, p.1). Kristeva places
the object in the economy of desire as that which drives and defines meaning and ego,
while the abject in its exclusion from the psyche “draws me toward the place where
meaning collapses” (1982, p.2). Even though the abject has been categorized as that
which is “not I” it is registered nonetheless and so, as with all psychic material that is
rejected but still part and parcel of psychic reality, it returns to haunt all that “I am.”
Kristeva writes, “to each ego its object, to each superego its abject” (1982, p.2) seating
the abject with the superego, the site of idealized identifications that is theoretically
connected to the id and all that “I” do not want to know of my desires. Kristeva also
identifies the abject with an important boundary—as something that keeps us from
completely falling into the hole of meaninglessness.

She writes, “on the edge of

nonexistence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me.
There, abject and abjection are my safeguards. The primers of my culture” (1982, p.2).
Here the abject is further recognized as a base from which more developed ideas form
and as a subjective limit that is both fixed and static—a limit that will inevitably be push
past but never left behind.
Loaded in this process of free association is the encounter with that which is most
abhorrent, uncomfortable, and abject. Putting words to that which has thus far felt
unspeakable is the individual work of the analysand, but is also a phenomenon of artistic
creations that have the potential to redefine social and cultural boundaries. Menstruation
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has long existed at the edge of nonexistence in social discourse, which has lent it
significant power to the art, literature, and cinema that have drawn on it both intentionally
and inadvertently. Over the course of the last century these mediums have directly and
indirectly done the work of stripping longstanding menstrual taboos of their power,
draining ever more of the persecutory fragments that haunt the quotidian reality of
menstruation in all its complexity. And yet, the work remains ongoing as something will
always remain repressed, untouchable and at the point of abjection, and thus primed to
return to prey on our ambivalent relationships to blood and woman.
When reading or watching performances of Greek tragedies, the gory moments
upon which the dramatic power hinges, like Medea’s vengeful murder of her children or
the sacrifice of Iphigenia at the altar, are not shown on stage, but described in detail by a
witness reporting the scene of horror and sorrow. Gothic literature of the 19th and 20th
century centers on the grotesque and haunting cross-sections of psyche and body, but it
too, by the very nature of its form, relies on the reader’s imagination to elaborate on
scenes of gore and carnage. With the advent of cinema, a visual and more visceral
confrontation with violence, blood, and psychic terror became possible. The female body
has been the star, the location, and the metaphor for this visual encounter with terrifying
unknowns. Drawing on the classic literary and artistic tropes from the sacrificial virgin to
the menopausal witch, the horror film genre overloads the visual senses with the psychic
sense of the “too-muchness” of the female body as the viewer is caught in the blood of
disturbing acts of creation and destruction.
What was suppressed in centuries of taboo surrounding the menstrual cycle
(including the hygienic, bloodless discourse of medicine and advertising) has spilled onto
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the silver screen in countless films. Though the connection between the blood of the
horror genre and the female sexual reproductive system is often not explicitly made, there
are notable and unforgettable exceptions. Stephen King’s novel Carrie, adapted by Brian
de Palma (1976) and more recently by Kimberly Peirce (2013), comes to mind as a wellknown example that places female sexuality and the taboos around it at the heart of the
trauma that drives the plot. Carrie is raised in an evangelical Christian home where sex is
a sin, changes in her body are seen as manifestations of burgeoning sin, and education
and discussion about such matters is forbidden. When Carrie’s period arrives for the first
time in the girl’s locker room shower at school, she screams for help, believing herself to
be dying. Her peers, who have always considered her odd, throw pads and tampons at
her while shouting “Plug it up, plug it up!” In Peirce’s 2013 adaptation, some of the girls
whisper to each other that Carrie clearly doesn’t know what’s happening to her. Carrie
asks her mother, “Why didn’t you tell me?” incredulous that she would be kept ignorant
of knowledge of her own body. It is this withholding of knowledge that is unforgivable
to Carrie, who rejects her mother’s conviction she has done something wrong by
physically maturing. The humiliation Carrie endures at school and at home grows into a
powerful rage that she harnesses into supernatural powers as she develops her own
perspective and mind. Carrie makes the choice, despite her mother’s condemnation and
warning, to accept a sympathy invitation to the prom and is fooled by peers into believing
she has won the title of prom queen. The confusion, humiliation, and horror of the locker
room scene return when she is doused in a bucket of pig’s blood while standing on stage
to be crowned. Dripping with blood, Carrie’s supernatural rage wreaks havoc on all who
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have caused her to suffer—her powers of creation that arrived with her period pushed by
a cruel and punishing Other to the point of pure destruction.
The horror in Carrie’s story, as well as the stories of many other protagonists of
the genre, manifests as a result of what is not known, which becomes incarnated in
haunting hallucinations, menacing predators, and nightmare fugue states. The horror
genre draws from the implicit connection between what is not known or named and
mental illness. For those inhabiting a female body in this genre, the patriarchal structures
that control that which is most intimate of female bodies are as much a part of what
terrorizes and causes illness as the mysteries of the supernatural. Through often abstruse
narrative and searing visuals, the intensity of those phenomena that could be
characterized as psychotic or preOedipal—processes of projection and introjection,
identity loss, mind control, bodily possession, disorganized drives, violence, and the
structuring rules of civilization rendered meaningless— overtake the experience of the
viewer with the psychical suffering that conditions of oppression and silencing can
engender. The horror genre mines the depths of psychic phenomena described throughout
psychoanalytic theory and makes a cathartic spectacle (at least for fans of the genre) of
these invisible psychic forces, the experience of which cannot be fully captured by reason,
logic, or diagnostic manuals. In this genre the relation to the blood of female anatomy
and the life and death that terrifies us is unavoidable. What we encounter on the screen is
a representation of the fragmentation of language and meaning that blood, be it menstrual
or other, can provoke as boundaries are defied by uncontainable fluids, volatile emotions
and actions, and wounds and illnesses, that compromise distinctions between self and
other and life and death. Woman, other to herself and to others in the horror genre, recoils,
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along with the audience, from what emerges in relation to her body, ignorant of whether
it is her own creation or from something beyond her. The genre works at the ever shifting
border between the conscious and unconscious as well as the boundary at which all
theory and knowledge inevitably touches—the feminine.
Collapsed into one, woman and the feminine are identified with what is terrifying
about the unknowable, the hidden spaces of the female reproductive system filled with
fantasies of origins, endings, and possibilities for creation. The literal space that is
integral to the vagina and uterus are continuously plumbed for the passage they mark
between interior and exterior and subject and object. Moving from the horror film to one
of many examples of 20th century art that addressed the female anatomy and the feminine,
artist Carolee Schneemann’s piece, Interior Scroll, which she performed at various points
in the late 1970s, traversed the taboos on female anatomy to mark something of the space,
which she terms “vulvic,” that is generative across the symbolic, imaginary and real
dimensions. Standing as if a nude model in a drawing class, Schneemann posed and then
began to paint parts of her body, simultaneously the artist and the art. The markings
evoke scenes of one of her earlier pieces, Meat Joy, a group performance of naked men
and women covered in paint and the blood of raw meat, poultry, and fish as they engage
in an orgiastic frenzy that teeters between the sublime and the grotesque. Interior Scroll
features Schneemann alone as she unfurls a narrow folded scroll from her vagina and
reads aloud her own writing. In a 2015 interview, Schneemann explains that the piece
was her way to “physicalize the invisible, marginalized, and deeply suppressed history
of the vulva, the powerful source of orgasmic pleasure, of birth, of transformation, of
menstruation, of maternity, to show that it is not a dead, invisible place” (Moreland,
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2015, para 8). She goes on to say that the idea was born from a dream in which she
discovered a piece of paper within her vagina with “the knowledge” written on it
(Moreland, 2015, para 7).
In a recent essay on her experience of undergoing bottom surgery, Andrea Long
Chu writes of the impossibility of the vagina being a symbol of woman, of the fact that it
is not necessary to have a vagina to be a woman, but also, of her desire to have a vagina
to “feel more like a woman” (2019, p.12), almost as if what she is after is “the knowledge”
that having a certain anatomy seems to promise. However, she notes how many ciswomen reject the very womanly traits others envy, often protesting that none of the
trappings of girl and womanhood are what they seem. Chu writes that what she is after is
not what women have or denounce, but the space their bodies hold: “I don’t want what
you have, I want the way in which you don’t have it. I don’t envy your plentitude; I envy
your void. Now I’ve got the hole to prove it” (2019, p.18). For Schneemann, this hole
was the site of censure and erasure, an anatomical reality rendered void that excluded
women from the art world and thus from acts of artistic creation that could be recognized
as such. Interior Scroll turns the table on this denial, demonstrating the powers of
creation the space holds across the registers as well as the irony in denying those bearing
female anatomy the privilege to create and inscribe themselves within the social link.
Chu’s desire to possess this literal space—this void—similarly confronts the RSI knot, as
she seeks a change in the real to embody the essential hole through which all of the
registers tie together. The inextricable linking of the RSI registers is something that each
subject forms and potentially resolves in her own unique way, the procession toward this
reliant on the feminine space that affords novel creation.
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The feminine as described here in its relationship to art, literature, speech, theory,
and the work of analysis, is that which confounds harsh and subjugating strictures with
the infinite potential of the lack. Because anatomy cannot escape the symbolic dimension
that instantly identifies, categorizes, and systematizes it, we are forever contending with,
as Chu and Schneemann illustrate, the place and effects of anatomy in how we are
situated and situate ourselves in the world. Many voices, however, reject the association
between woman and feminine with that which is considered negative, lacking, absent, or
other, and read Lacan’s work and terminology as an infuriating extension of the concrete
anatomy focused theory of the 20s and 30s instead of as a passage through the stalemate.
And yet, at the same time that Lacan’s theory is challenged, there is often an implicit
embrace of the essence of what the theory opens, an inadvertent tribute to the work on the
feminine that Lacan labors to articulate in his later seminars. Much of the time, the work
of these voices of dissent reads as an attempt to work through and be released from the
specific signifiers that tie woman to a history of subordination in which the phallus in its
equivalence with the penis reigns supreme.
In The Laugh of the Medusa, Cixous (1976) rejects the link between the feminine
and that which is lacking, writing that the feminine “affirms” and has “no womanly
reason to pledge allegiance to the negative” (p.884). Instead, she calls for a celebration
of what is rather than what is missing and emphasizes language’s capacities to soothe, to
unite, and to bridge. In Coming to Writing, Cixous (1991) heralds the act of writing as
a way of leaving no space for death, of pushing back forgetfulness, of
never letting oneself be surprised by the abyss. Of never becoming
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resigned, consoled; never turning over in bed to face the wall and drift
asleep again as if nothing had happened; as if nothing could happen (p. 3)
She proposes in The Laugh of Medusa an écriture féminine that forms in relation to a
woman’s own body, which she says when censored, denies the breath and speech that
provide access to the unconscious. Cixous calls for an infusion of the female body into
language and writing, a protest against the centuries of denial the female body and those
identified as women endured. Yet, this desire to fight back death, and never let “oneself
be surprised by the abyss” rings with a kind of fantastical phallic furor that denies the
essential theory of the unconscious and its inevitable, unavoidable surprises.
In a similar vein, Luce Irigaray strives for the creation of a language that escapes
patriarchal dominance and belongs to the feminine. For Irigaray, this language is never
correct, frozen, or fixed in its movement with the contours and conditions of the female
anatomy. In Irigaray’s famous When Our Lips Speak Together (1980), the vaginal lips
are invited to speak their own meaning separate from a singular, phallic determination. A
play on the phonetic resonance between the French word for blood, sang, and the word
for meaning or sense, sens, is central as she writes, “Your blood is translated into their
senses” (1980, p. 69) and later,
Wait. My blood is coming back from their senses. It's getting warmer
inside us, between us. Their words are becoming empty, bloodless, dead
skins. While our lips are becoming red again. They're stirring, they're
moving, they want to speak. What do you want to say? Nothing. Everything. Yes. Be patient. You will say it all. Begin with what you feel, here,
right away. The female ‘all’ will come (1980, p. 75).
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The two vaginal lips that are also one speak to new ideas of separation and difference
through their anatomical structure, and circle around the idea of a feminine “all” that is
not subject to the idea of lack. The blood of the body imbues all meaning with life and it
must flow for words to become incarnated speech. This “all” that is promised rings with
the idea of feminine jouissance that in moments is available, but only fleetingly captured,
and never fully by language, and which is drained and deadened without the blood of the
body.
How not to read Lacan’s interventions at the surface? How not to encounter this
theory as just another perpetuation of the history of denying women their bodies, their
sang and sens, and their powers of creation and destruction? The draw to wholeness, to
cohesion, and to achieving an “all” can be understood, but also, at least in these examples
of resistance, recreates an imaginary phallic fantasy in its refusal of the lack. Mieli writes
With the assumption of femininity, men and women have the power to
unmask the imposture of every discourse that claims to be absolute and
universal, the power to relate to theory dialectically. Let us note, then, that
it is precisely in their complaints about what they are lacking, that women
are caught in a "male logic," that they embrace a phallic discourse of
wholeness, by which somebody exists who has what they don't have.
(2001, p.7)
Mieli goes on to elucidate the integral relationship between femininity and desire, which
is born from lack. In assuming a gender, one encounters a loss, a lack, and a limit to
what one is and can be—this is castration as it is encountered in the symbolic. The
encounter with this castration and the lack can be painful and fragmenting, but this is just
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one definition and dimension of the experience that does not embrace its necessity in
relation to creation. As Mieli writes,
If in common parlance the word lacking acquires a negative connotation with all the debasement and misrepresentation that traditionally
accompanies its connection with the notion of femininity - this very fact
reveals the symptomatic quality of the prejudice that it stages. This
prejudice, however, is structurally rooted in thought's messianic quality.
Why, in fact, would lack have inevitable negative connotations, if it
weren't for the illusion of an existing wholeness? (2001, p. 5)
And so, this fantasy of experiencing it “all” through language, to fight back death and to
avoid mourning—to achieve the God-like all of knowledge, time, and space—will
inevitably reach a limit and fall short. There is much to be savored and enjoyed in
language’s capacity to connect and enliven, but to deny the other side is untenable and
even dangerous, especially when working as a clinician, where the space of not-knowing
and of not understanding must be held to allow ever more to emerge.
In Sexuality in the Field of Vision Jacqueline Rose (2005) traces the feminist
rejection of the Freudian and Lacanian tradition to the problems of the debates on female
sexuality of the 20s and 30s. Rose comments on feminism’s pull to integration and in turn
critiques the loss of the fundamental and revolutionary Freudian unconscious from which
Lacan’s notion of the divided subject emerges. Rose notes that
Feminism asks psychoanalysis for an account of how ideologies are
imposed upon subjects and how female identity is acquired, only to find
that the concepts of fantasy and the unconscious rule any notion of pure
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imposition or full acquisition out of bounds. Or more recently, as
feminism turns to the practices and limits of sexuality, calling for a
pluralism which the analytic concept of a multifarious sexual disposition
might appear to legitimate or support, it finds itself up against the problem
of any sexual identity for the subject and the lie of any simple assertion of
self (2005, p. 16).
The psychoanalytic technique of adherence to the letter of each analysand returns to the
specificity that makes the theory and practice such a problem for the world of empirical
study. The tension between the universal and the singular resonates with but also resists
the trend toward pluralism and multiplicity that appears as an alternative to the core
psychoanalytic proposition of singularity. Rose evokes the revolutionary idea that the
subject is not predicated, but instead born from a cacophony of unique corporeal
experiences, of polymorphous perversities that circulate and form through the drives.
While the imaginary register reaches for a whole and complete account of what
anatomical difference means once and for all, the subject cannot be fully accounted for in
her polyvalent particularity.
Despite the frustrations and limitations of language that in moments feminism
attempted to escape, the desire to suffuse language with the female anatomy and the
feminine is a generative project that has inspired many to further push the limit of what
can be said and represented. For example, an extension of Cixous and Irigary’s search
for an écriture feminine comes to life in the paintings of Mira Schor, which venture into
textual and visual explorations of polymorphous psychoanalytic sexuality. A 1993
painting entitled “Hairy Semi-Colon,” suggests the idea of the feminine in the adornment
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of the punctuation mark with flesh and pubic hair, but also in the evocation of the mark’s
function as a bridge to another thought—of there being a “yes, and...” instead of a full
stop period. Schor’s paintings map the path of the drives through both female and male
anatomy, as vaginas and penises are marked and even drip with what can be interpreted
as the blood of life and death; flesh colored shades contrast with reds and rusts that
circulate as fluids, sounds, and the gaze, through tenuous tendon like lines running
between organs and objects sometimes missing from the canvas.
In Maggie Nelson’s 2015 book The Argonauts, the tension between Cixous’s
declaration that language can fight off the void and the Lacanian underscoring of its
limitations (which she grounds in the work of Wittgenstein), is sharply rendered as
Nelson acknowledges the impossibility of words to capture all of what is meant and felt,
but also surrenders to the pleasures of what language can do. Nelson depicts an approach
to sex that has nothing and everything to do with anatomy, of pleasures and eroticism that
is not after some ultimate genital goal, but is instead experienced across sexes, species,
and generations. Nelson does not strive for an “all” but instead illustrates the infinite and
finite reach of polymorphous sexuality in all its fragmented particularity. Nelson’s
revelatory writing captures the texture of the feminine as she sidesteps the confines of
phallic theorizing, weaving hard-won experience and intellectual work with that which is
sensuous, personal, and free from tired structures. Citing the work of queer theorist Eve
Sedgwick, Nelson writes of “that which is more than one, and more than two, but less
than infinity,” and quotes Sedgwick’s ethos in writing and thinking: “pluralize and
specify” (2015, p. 62). There are countless variations, identifications, and modes of
expression, and yet, there is a limit nonetheless—something that hedges us against the
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overwhelming nature of infinity. This is the very limit and lesson revealed with each
period and across the entire female reproductive life. This is also the limit of language,
which cannot completely mark whether something is an ending or a beginning, where
you end and I begin, and ultimately where death is.
In each of the works described, there is a question of woman taking back their
bodies—of becoming the agents of what circulates instead of remaining the suffering
hysterics whose unconscious truths return with horrific vengeance. How to know when
the shift from victim to agent has taken hold? Perhaps, at a minimum, when something
of the suffering that brings subjects to analysis becomes more bearable. Perhaps when
new possibilities open, when alternatives to the discourse that dominates can be inhabited.
For some of the artists and writers discussed, psychoanalytic theory is the very discourse
to be altered and left behind, their projects reaching toward another way of relating and
connecting through their own inventions. These works inspire and bring me to new
vistas, revealing paths toward surprising modes of expression and existence. But as a
clinician I return to Freud and Lacan and the fundamentals of psychoanalytic theory that
ethically ground a practice that fosters new possibilities for those struggling to forge them
alone. The seductiveness and clinical utility of Freud’s discovery of the unconscious and
Lacan’s notion of the divided subject emerge through an encounter with the feminine as it
embodies the void, the space, the hole, the lack, and the unknown—that which
destabilizes the ego, identity, and our fixed notions of the body, that which erases
boundaries and the distinctions between self and other and life and death. It is the “toomuchness” of our minds and bodies, both circulating with the real and symbolic blood of
life and death, of which menstruation is just another persistent reminder, that pulls us
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toward the unanswerable questions and unassimilable truths. It is from the point of
overwhelm, of not-knowing, of non-wholeness, that each subject makes her unique mark.
It is this point that the analyst must sustain.
Writing about menstruation is an attempt to mark what passes month after month,
year after year—until it doesn’t. A mysterious but known relationship with a hidden yet
visible force inside the body. Sometimes there is a sense that it can be read on the face if
not red on the pants. A desire to share something of it, to have it be known, all while
knowing it can only be borne alone. At times it becomes the point of explanation, the
understanding that illuminates everything and nothing at once. The intensity and
frustration and volatility of daily domestic scenes rendered all the more vivid as the
upheaval of the anatomy during menstruation drives truths to be spoken and just as easily
renders them meaningless. And then, maybe, they return—perhaps what is seen and felt
during that time of the month is real, something that has emerged from the depths to
disrupt the Other as much as it may be disrupted by the Other. This hidden yet visible
force may come to be spoken, seen, and even written in analysis, where through a
mapping of its patterns and its effects, a new knowledge is forged.
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